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INTRODUCTION: A VISION OF COMPROMISE
From the outset, Congress's crafting of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964-the main federal law prohibiting employment discrimination-was
marked by compromise. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) was initially conceived as a strong federal enforcement agency that
could issue binding orders and oversee adversarial hearings. But the EEOC that
ultimately emerged from legislative bargaining in the year the Act was passed
was limited to a mostly investigatory and gatekeeping role. The final enforce-
ment scheme of Title VII relied heavily on an individual private right of action,
through which employees could file private lawsuits alleging discrimination
against their employers in federal court. Fifty years and numerous amendments
later, Title VII's enforcement mechanism remains largely unchanged: the EEOC
provides a crucial, but circumscribed administrative and enforcement function,
while the bulk of federal antidiscrimination enforcement responsibility falls to
private civil lawsuits.'
Numerous scholars have written about the relative advantages and, more
often, disadvantages of this enforcement scheme. Employment law scholars
have mostly criticized the public side of the enforcement balance as too limited,
suggesting that the EEOC should be strengthened, expanded, re-imagined, or-
if all else fails-relieved of its gatekeeping role and re-focused.2 Empirical schol-
1. See infra Part I.
2. See, e.g., Pam Jenoff, As Equal as Others?: Rethinking Access to Discrimination Law,
81 U. CIN. L. REV. 85 (2012); Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is out There: Re-
vamping Federal Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century,
2009 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193; Nancy M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63
SMU L. REV. 1237 (2010); Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice
Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 219 (1995); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nel-
son, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion as a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 663, 7o8-o9; Michael Selmi, The Value
of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Roles in Employment Discrimination Law,
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1996); Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Admin-
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ars have identified the limitations of an antidiscrimination enforcement system
that relies on employees to initiate private lawsuits against their employers: the
problem of "naming, blaming, and claiming" when employees may neither per-
ceive nor report discrimination.' On the other hand, political scientists and ad-
ministrative law scholars have explained the value of private mechanisms for the
enforcement of public laws-to (among other things) ensure separation of
powers and freedom from politics and regulatory capture.4 If the normative as-
sumption is that employment discrimination is undesirable (as a matter of ei-
ther fairness or business efficiency), and if the normative goal is effective anti-
discrimination enforcement (to both root out meritless claims swiftly and
pursue legitimate claims vigorously), then strong enforcement through both
public and private mechanisms is likely ideal. In the real world, however, the
opposite has occurred.
This Article documents how, over the past six years and coinciding with the
"Great Recession of 2oo8," both public and private antidiscrimination en-
forcement mechanisms have become increasingly constrained, such that the
ability to enforce the mandate of Title VII may be facing a crisis point. While
istrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405; Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Pub-
lic Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434 (2003). For other interesting discussion and
proposals, see David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123
YALE L.J. 616, 699-711 (2013), which applies an agency theory to reconceive the
EEOC's role as litigation gatekeeper; Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm
for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory
Mediation, 1o5 DICK. L. REv. 305, 335-57 (2001), which proposes private mandatory
mediation of EEOC charges; and Charles A. Sullivan, The Enforcement of Title VII:
Meshing Public and Private Efforts, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 48o (1976), which discusses
the early procedural complications of the EEOC's hybrid public-private enforce-
ment scheme.
3. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008); Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Cul-
ture Matters: Cultural Differences in the Reporting of Employment Discrimination
Claims, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 405 (2011) (developing a theory of how values
within Asian-American communities contribute to under-reporting); Nielsen &
Nelson, supra note 2, at 68. The term and typology of "naming, blaming, and
claiming" comes from William L. F. Felsteiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat,
The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming... 15
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private En-
forcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 662-66 (2013); Sean Farhang, Legislative-
Executive Conflict and Private Statutory Litigation in the United States: Evidence
from Labor, Civil Rights, and Environmental Law, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657, 667-
73 (2012); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms
in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
5. See Catherine Rampell, 'Great Recession': A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES:
ECONOMIX BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology.
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enforcement mechanisms for federal antidiscrimination law have long left room
for improvement, recent developments in the economy, due to the 2oo8 reces-
sion, and in federal case law, due to a series of procedural decisions by the Rob-
erts Court, compels a reconsideration of the existing enforcement scheme. The
Article then theorizes a new model for combining public and private enforce-
ment efforts and using administrative procedures under existing law more ro-
bustly to leverage the relative strengths of each part of the statutorily designed
compromise. This proposed model offers both a strategic response to recent
economic and legal developments that threaten effective antidiscrimination en-
forcement and an opportunity to more perfectly realize Congress's original en-
forcement vision.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the existing enforcement
mechanism for Title VII, including its development over time. Title VII
emerged from the legislature in 1964 with virtually no public agency enforce-
ment. Congress has since passed two major amendments to the Act's enforce-
ment scheme, slightly expanding public enforcement in 1972 and significantly
enhancing incentives for private enforcement in 1991.6 As a result, while the
EEOC plays an important but limited public enforcement role, the private right
of action guaranteed to individuals under Title VII remains the key to enforcing
federal antidiscrimination law.
Part II illustrates how, over the past six years, the Great Recession of 20o8
has impacted the public side of the enforcement equation, placing the EEOC-
already criticized as having too limited an enforcement role-in an even more
untenable position. Some economic and social science data indicate that work-
place inequality, particularly by race, has likely been exacerbated by the 20o8
recession. 7 Moreover, during the recession, the number of discrimination
charges filed with the EEOC rose so significantly that, by 2011, the EEOC re-
ported "a record number of new charges of discrimination" received by the
agency in its fifty year history, "[f]or the second year in a row."'8 Whatever the
root cause of the increase and whether or not the charges are meritorious, this
influx of charges presents an increased drain on public enforcement resources.
The 2008 recession has also had a direct impact on the EEOC itself: as a result of
6. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972); infra
Part I.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See U.S. EEOC, Press Release, Private Sector Bias Charges Hit All-Time High (Jan.
25, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-24-12a.cfm; U.S. EEOC,
Press Release, EEOC Reports Job Bias Charges Hit Record High of Nearly loo,ooo in
Fiscal Year 2010 (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/i1i
-n.cfm; infra Part I.B; see also Catherine Rampell, More Workers Complain of Bias
on the Job, a Trend Linked to Widespread Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2ou/o1/12/business/12bias.html (documenting how ex-
perts hypothesized the principle reason for the increase was linked to the number
of individuals being laid off permanently).
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recessionary federal budget cuts and sequestration, both the number of EEOC
staff available to respond to charges and the number of enforcement lawsuits
filed by the EEOC have now dropped to their lowest point in recent history.9 A
future economic rebound has the potential to reduce some of this strain on the
EEOC; indeed, the number of discrimination charges filed with the EEOC
dropped modestly between fiscal years 2012 and 2013.0 But the longer-term
"economic scarring" caused by the recession, which has both chilled businesses'
re-hiring" and decreased federal agency budgets going forward, 2 makes it likely
that the EEOC will remain overburdened for the foreseeable future.
In Part III, the Article turns to documenting how, during the same time pe-
riod, private enforcement efforts have suffered even more dramatic constraints
than the public efforts of the EEOC. Between 2007 and 2013, the U.S. Supreme
Court made a series of procedural 3 decisions that, in cumulative effect, signifi-
9. See U.S. EEOC, EEOC Budget and Staffing History 198o to Present, http://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/plan/budgetandstaffing.cfm (showing approved staffing for 2013 and
2014 as the lowest number since 198o); infra Part II.B.
iO. See U.S. EEOC, Charge Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2o13, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (showing a decrease from over 99,000 charges
filed in FY 2010, 2011, and 2012 to 93,727 charges filed in FY 2013-but still a signif-
icant increase over the 82,792 charges filed in FY 2007, prior to the 2008 reces-
sion).
11. See, e.g., John Irons, Economic Scarring: The Long-Term Impacts of the Recession,
ECON. POL'Y INST. 3, 6-9, (Sept. 30, 2009), http://s4.epi.org/files/page/-/img/
nloo9scarring.pdf (providing a general overview of the long term economic ef-
fects of recession).
12. See, e.g., D. Andrew Austin, The Budget Control Act and Trends in Discretionary
Spending, CONG. RES. SERVICE 5, 12-14, 21-27, 35-36 (Nov. 26, 2014), http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RL34424.pdf (discussing post-recession federal budget legislation
and the declining proportion of the budget allocated for non-defense discretion-
ary spending); Table 8.7-Outlays for Discretionary Programs: 1962-2o19, WHITE
HOUSE OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/budget/fy2ol5/assets/histo8z7.xls (forecasting discretionary spending budget
outlays from 2013 to 2019 to show a decline in non-defense spending from 2o12 to
2013 and 2013 to 2014, followed by incremental increases until 2019, never reaching
the 2012 number).
13. Substantively, the Roberts Court shrank the doctrine of antidiscrimination law
during this time period as well, by: limiting employer efforts to avoid disparate
impact claims, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); prohibiting a "mixed mo-
tive" theory of proof under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); expanding the "ministerial exception" under
Title VII, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694 (2012); and limiting who constitutes a "supervisor" for purposes of hostile
work environment claims, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). Even
the one area of antidiscrimination law that the Court seemed to expand during
this time period-the law of retaliation-has not proven particularly helpful to
plaintiffs. Despite broadening both what types of actions constitute retaliation,
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cantly narrowed the scope of the individual private right of action key to en-
forcing Title VII.14 Acting in three key areas-pleading requirements, arbitra-
tion agreements, and class certification rules-the Court charted a course pro-
cedurally constraining the ability of employees who experience discrimination
to assert such claims in a judicial forum. In 2007 and 2009, in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly15 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,6 the Court amplified the pleading require-
ments needed to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in civil
lawsuits, including employment discrimination suits. In a series of cases decid-
ed between 2009 and 2013-including 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett,'7 AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion,"8 and American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant'9 -the Court
strengthened the mandatory nature of agreements to arbitrate employment and
consumer disputes, upholding arbitration agreements over varied challenges to
their enforceability. In 2011, in Wal-Mart v. Dukes,2 ° the Court interpreted the
rules of class certification narrowly, making large-scale employment discrimina-
tion class actions more difficult to pursue. The collective result of these deci-
sions has been to narrow plaintiffs' access to federal courts during a time when
employees may have needed it the most-a narrowing that will remain long af-
Crawford v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009); Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), and who may constitute the victim of re-
taliation, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), analysis of cases ap-
plying the Roberts Court's retaliation precedent at the district court level reveals,
as Professor Deborah Brake describes it, a "picture of retaliation law for employ-
ees [that] is not nearly as rosy as the Court's decisions have led legal scholars to
believe." Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L. REV. 115,115-16
(2014). Moreover, the Court's most recent retaliation decision retreated from its
prior trend of expanding retaliation doctrine, instead prohibiting a "mixed mo-
tive" theory of proof for retaliation claims, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
However, a discussion of the constraints imposed on the doctrine of Title VII
by the Roberts Court is beyond the scope of this Article's focus on the procedural
constraints on Title VII's private right of action and suggestions for use of admin-
istrative enforcement procedures to overcome them. Substantive limitations to
the doctrine of Title VII apply equally to a plaintiff's claims regardless of whether
the plaintiff pursues those claims using administrative procedures, litigation, or
both.
14. See infra Part Ill.
15. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
16. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
17. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
18. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
19. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
20. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
124
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ter the Great Recession has passed, with the potential to change the enforce-
ment of federal antidiscrimination law going forward.2'
Part IV of this Article offers a model for responding to this perfect storm of
challenges to antidiscrimination enforcement, first identifying the EEOC's pro-
cedural advantages in the wake of recent precedent and the private bar's practi-
cal advantages given federal budget tightening, and then proposing ideas for
combining public and private enforcement efforts. Interestingly, because of the
statutory enforcement authority Congress delegated to the EEOC in the text of
Title VII, the agency itself remains largely unaffected by the recent procedural
Supreme Court decisions. The EEOC serves a gatekeeping role, providing a
basic administrative exhaustion procedure that all plaintiffs must meet before
they can file a lawsuit,' and a crucial, but limited enforcement role, represent-
ing a few hundred plaintiffs out of the nearly loo,ooo who file charges (less than
0.5 percent) each year.23 The agency's exhaustion procedures also offer oppor-
tunities for administrative resolution, such as voluntary mediation, that parties
may, but are not required to, take advantage of prior to filing a lawsuit. 4 Filing
a charge with the EEOC remains unaffected by Twombly and Iqbal and requires
completing a simple intake and charge form. 5 The EEOC has administrative
enforcement authority to pursue a lawsuit in court against an employer who has
committed discrimination, even if the employees are covered by arbitration
agreements binding under Pyett, Concepcion, and Italian Colors.26 And, the
EEOC may litigate systemic discrimination cases without having to satisfy Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for class certification-a process made more dif-
ficult for private plaintiffs in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.2 7 Part IV suggests how to capi-
talize on these procedural and practical advantages through partnership
between public and private enforcers and reinvigoration of what I call "admin-
istrative antidiscrimination law"-the advocacy that occurs during enforcement
steps between filing an EEOC charge and pursuing a private lawsuit in court.
Recent legal and economic developments threaten to undermine both pub-
lic and private enforcement of federal antidiscrimination law; new models for
21. See, e.g., ScOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
SLAMMING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS? 79-126 (2013).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012); U.S. EEOC, Filing a Lawsuit, http://www.eeoc
.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm.
23. See U.S. EEOC, Enforcement and Litigation Statistics, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/index.cfm (reporting that, between 2007 and 2013, the
EEOC represented between 148 and 362 plaintiffs in litigation out of the 82,792 to
99,947 charges employees filed with it each year).
24. See infra Part IV.B.
25. See infra Part IVA.
26. See infra Part IV.A; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
27. See infra Part IV.A; see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 320 (1980).
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fulfilling Title Vil's mandate are needed. Legal scholars have written about how
to improve either a private attorney general model or a public agency model of
Title VII enforcement, offering suggestions that are useful but would require
significant additional funding or legislative change.' This Article proposes an
alternative: a pragmatic combined public-private approach, in which private
plaintiffs' attorneys and the EEOC work together to leverage their relative
strengths to overcome the limitations of recent precedent and a slow economy.
Given the significant constraints imposed in recent years on both pieces of the
statutory mechanism to enforce federal antidiscrimination law, the time is ripe
for re-envisioning its design. A public-private enforcement partnership and
more rigorous use of administrative processes already available under existing
law can provide a way out of this "recessionary period" in the enforcement of
antidiscrimination rights.
I. THE HYBRID ENFORCEMENT SCHEME FOR FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW
A. The Original Compromise
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing in hiring, firing, compensation, and all other "terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment" on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or reli-
gion. 9 Since its enactment, Title VI1's enforcement mechanism has been
marked by a "hybrid" approach: a combination of limited public agency en-
forcement with an express private right of action provided to individuals. 0 As
passed in 1964, the statute gave the EEOC virtually no enforcement authority,
relying almost exclusively on individuals to bring private lawsuits under the
Act.3' Facing strong opposition in the Senate, advocates of the original bill were
forced to compromise, accepting a highly circumscribed level of public en-
28. See infra Part IV.C.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe, 200oe-2 to -17 (2012).
30. See, e.g., Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 4, at 661 (describing how, in "hy-
brid regimes" of statutory enforcement, "either public or private enforcement can
be given the dominant role, with the other playing a more ancillary one"). Title
VII's private right of action is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(f).
31. See Civil Rights: Private Cause of Action Exists Under Title VII Notwithstanding
EEOC Determination of No Reasonable Cause, 1971 DUKE L.I. 467, 468-72; U.S.
EEOC, Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of EEOC, http://www.eeoc.govl
eeoc/history/35th/prea965/index.html. In the five decades since its passage, nu-
merous legal scholars have recounted the legislative history of Title VII and the
development of the EEOC and its administrative procedures. For others' accounts
of these matters, see, for example, Green, supra note 2, at 335-57; McCormick, su-
pra note 2, at 201-07 and Selmi, supra, note 2, at 5-10.
126
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forcement.32 Earlier versions of the Act would have empowered the EEOC to
hold adversarial hearings and issue orders enforceable by a court or, instead, to
bring a civil lawsuit against a discriminating employer.33 Yet a series of amend-
ments to get the bill out of the Senate reduced the agency's authority, with the
effect of making federal government involvement a "secondary, rather than
primary enforcement alternative. 3 4 Proponents then used this limited public
enforcement authority to assuage conservative fears, arguing that the amended
Act would have "a small incremental effect" on antidiscrimination laws already
in effect in some states.35
Under the 1964 statute, the EEOC's role was limited to taking, investigating,
and attempting to conciliate discrimination complaints; when conciliation
failed, individual employees were required to bring a lawsuit themselves. 36 If a
complaint had the potential to involve "pattern or practice" claims, the EEOC
did not litigate, but instead referred the complaint to the Department of Jus-
tice.37 Indeed, the EEOC's role was so secondary to private enforcement actions
that even a Commission finding of "no reasonable cause" to support an em-
ployee's discrimination complaint to the EEOC did not-and still to this day,
does not-bar a plaintiff from separately pursuing her complaint in federal
court.38 At the core of the limited authority Congress ultimately conferred on
the EEOC in 1964 was capitulation to many congressmembers' preference that
"the ultimate determination of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary,"
rather than with an enforcement agency.39
32. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH BARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 20-21 (1st ed. 2012); U.S. EEOC, Pre
1965, supra note 31.
33. Civil Rights: Private Cause of Action Exists, supra note 31, at 469.
34. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 21; see also Civil Rights: Private Cause of Action
Exists, supra note 31, at 470-72.
35. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 21.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-4 to -5 (2012); McCormick, supra note 2, at 202-07; U.S.
EEOC, Pre 1965, supra note 31.
37. See Green, supra note 2, at 316-23; U.S. EEOC, Pre 1965, supra note 31.
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973) (citing with
approval several appellate court holdings that "court actions under Title VII are
de novo proceedings and.., a Commission 'no reasonable cause' finding does
not bar a lawsuit in the case"); see also Civil Rights: Private Cause of Action Exists,
supra note 31 (describing the Third Circuit's similar holding in Fekete v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970)).
39. Civil Rights: Private Cause of Action Exists, supra note 31, at 469 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963)); see also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative Histo-
ry, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431, 436 (1966).
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B. Congressional Expansion of Public Enforcement
For the first seven years after Title VII's enactment, the EEOC was focused
on establishing procedures, processing charges, and issuing policy guidance-
earning its description as a "toothless tiger.I4 ° During this period, the short-
comings of the original Act's enforcement scheme became apparent. While the
agency leveraged its limited power to reach some major conciliation agree-
ments, increase awareness of Title VII remedies, and encourage employer com-
pliance, congressional hearings held in 1971 revealed that employment discrimi-
nation remained both widespread and severe.4' As a result, Congress amended
the Act in 1972 to increase the scope of the EEOC's enforcement capability, but
left the essential enforcement mechanism of the individual private right of ac-
tion untouched.4 The 1972 amendment expanded the scope of the EEOC's en-
forcement, giving the Commission the authority-after conciliation attempts
failed-to initiate civil lawsuits seeking injunction and other remedies against
private employers, either on its own or on behalf of an employee who had filed
a charge with the agency.43 The EEOC was also granted the ability to litigate
"pattern or practice" systemic discrimination claims (in conjunction with the
Attorney General at first, then later, alone).44
Again, debate over increasing the EEOC's authority was vigorous, and legis-
lative compromise ruled the day: an earlier version of the amendment had tried
once more to grant the EEOC authority to issue binding orders on employers,
but this was dropped from the final version of the bill.45 Thus, while the EEOC
was granted the ability to bring suit in federal court, two key elements of the
Act's original enforcement scheme remained: the judiciary, not the EEOC, still
ultimately determined whether illegal discrimination had occurred, and the pri-
vate right of action for individuals to bring federal lawsuits was "expressly pre-
served."46
40. See Green, supra note 2, at 313, 316-23; U.S. EEOC, 1965-1971: A "Toothless Tiger"
Helps Shape the Law and Educate the Public, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/
35th/1965-71/index.html.
41. See Green, supra note 2, at 323-24; U.S. EEOC, The 197os: The "Toothless Tiger"
Gets Its Teeth-A New Era of Enforcement, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/
1970s/index.html.
42. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 1O3;
Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical
Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUST. REL. L.J.
1, 47-52 (1977).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-4 to -5 (2012); Hill, supra note 42, at 51-52.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-4 to -5 (2012); Hill, supra note 42, at 51-52.
45. See Hill, supra note 42, at 47-52.
46. See id. at 47, 51.
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C. Congressional Expansion of Private Enforcement
In its next amendment to Title VII twenty years later, Congress essentially
doubled down on its reliance on private lawsuits as the primary means of en-
forcing the Act. After two decades in which EEOC enforcement rose and fell in
response to internal agency efforts and changing executive branch priorities,47 a
series of Supreme Court decisions limiting Title VII doctrine and proof struc-
tures finally spurred Congress to action. 4' In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Congress not only restored prior proof structures to Title VII, but also en-
hanced the private right of action significantly. The 1991 Act clarified that plain-
tiffs could allege discrimination under three different theories of proof: dispar-
ate treatment, where an employer engaged in intentional discrimination
because of an employee's protected classification (race, color, national origin,
sex, or religion); mixed-motive disparate treatment, where an employee's pro-
tected classification was at least one "motivating factor" for an employer's in-
tentional discrimination; and disparate impact, where a facially neutral employ-
er policy or practice led to discriminatory results in the workplace. 49
Moreover, the 1991 Act established a plaintiffs right to jury trial, enhanced
a prevailing party's attorneys' fees to include expert fees, and added compensa-
tory and punitive damages (subject to caps) as available remedies for intention-
al discrimination under the Act.50 Believing that "additional remedies... [were]
needed to deter unlawful... discrimination in the workplace,"5' Congress fo-
cused on strengthening plaintiffs' potential rewards to offset the risks associated
with acting as private attorneys general. Access to a jury trial and significantly
expanded remedies attracted the plaintiffs' bar. As intended, the number of at-
torneys willing to represent plaintiffs in private civil lawsuits to enforce Title VII
on a contingency basis rose significantly after 1991.52
47. See U.S. EEOC, Prelude to the i8os-Reorganization and Expanded Authority,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/197os/prelude.html; U.S. EEOC, The 198os:
A Period of Change and Reassessment, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/
198os/index.html.
48. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, §§ 2(2), 3(2) & (4);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (mixed motive proof); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (disparate impact); see also U.S.
EEOC, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/199os/
civilrights.html.
49. Civil Rights Act §§ 105, 107(m).
50. Id. §§ 102, 1o3; see 42 U.S.C. § 198ia (2012).
51. Civil Rights Act § 2(1).
52. See Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-2, 30-31 (2009).
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D. Antidiscrimination Enforcement Today
In the decades since the 1991 amendment, the EEOC has actively pursued
strategic litigation to enforce and shape antidiscrimination law; yet, private law-
suits still constitute the vast majority of Title VII enforcement litigation. Today,
the EEOC's main role is one of a gatekeeper: before any employee can file a law-
suit in federal court, the employee must go through the EEOC's administrative
exhaustion procedure, in which the employee files a charge with the agency and
the agency (usually, but not always) conducts an investigation. 5" Throughout
this process, the EEOC also offers voluntary opportunities for administrative
resolution of the case, such as mediation, prior to the parties going to court.5 4 In
the vast majority of cases, the administrative process ends with the EEOC issu-
ing a "Notice of a Right-to-Sue" to the employee, which then allows the em-
ployee to find an attorney and file a private lawsuit in federal court."
In a small number of cases, the EEOC itself pursues enforcement litigation.
Such litigation derives either from a plaintiff's charges filed with the agency or
from the agency's own investigation and enforcement priorities. 6 Since 2000,
the EEOC has filed between 148 and 428 lawsuits from the 75,428 to 99,947
charges it has received each year-meaning that the agency filed lawsuits to en-
force between 0.2% and o.6% of the charges it received each year.17 In contrast,
during the same time period plaintiffs filed between 12,910 and 21,928 employ-
ment-related civil rights lawsuits in federal district courts each year-on aver-
age, 55 times as many lawsuits as filed by the EEOC each year. 8
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012); C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling for Less? Organiza-
tional Determinants of Discrimination-Charge Outcomes, 42 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 239,
243-46 (2008); U.S. EEOC, The Charge Handling Process, http://www.eeoc.gov/
employees/process.cfm; U.S. EEOC, Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 22.
54. See infra Part IV.B; Hirsh, supra note 53, at 243, 247; U.S. EEOC, Filing a Lawsuit,
supra note 22; U.S. EEOC, Resolving a Charge, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/
resolving.cfm.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(f); U.S. EEOC, Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 22.
56. U.S. EEOC, Litigation Procedures, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/procedures
.cfm.
57. Data compiled by comparing U.S. EEOC, EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997
Through FY 2M3, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm,
with U.S. EEOC, Charge Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2013, http://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm, for each of the years between 2000
and 2013.
58. Data compiled by comparing the number of private cases filed-from Adminis-
trative Office of U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-2. U.S.
District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis ofJurisdiction and Nature of Suit,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCas
eloadStatistics/2o14/tables/Co2Man4.pdf, under the category "civil rights" and the
s ubcategory "employment"-with the number of cases filed by the EEOC-from
U.S. EEOC, EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 57-for each of the years be-
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While perhaps shocking to the average employee, the significant dispropor-
tion between the number of public and private Title VII enforcement lawsuits is
the result of congressional design magnified over time. By creating a federal
agency to enforce Title VII while channeling all ultimate decision making about
whether discrimination occurred through the federal judiciary, Congress lim-
ited the EEOC's reach from the outset. Congress also relied heavily on the abil-
ity of individual employees to act upon Title VII's private right of action-a re-
liance that was purposefully deepened with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Today,
then, both precious EEOC resources to support public efforts and plaintiffs' ac-
cess to federal courts to support private efforts are essential to the successful en-
forcement of Title VII. Yet, as Parts II and III below describe, both sides of this
hybrid enforcement scheme are now at risk, creating the need-and the oppor-
tunity-to reimagine effective enforcement within the bounds of existing law. 9
II. RECEDING PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT: THE OVERBURDENING OF THE EEOC,
2007-2013
As a result of the Great Recession of 2008, the demand for public enforce-
ment of federal antidiscrimination law increased at the same time that available
resources for public enforcement efforts declined. Compelling economic and
social scientific evidence suggests that race and sex inequality at work-and
with it, the possibility of discrimination-was exacerbated by the recession.6"
Measuring discrimination is inherently difficult, and these data alone cannot
serve as a proxy for proof of intentional discrimination. Yet the evidence does
support erring on the side of believing that discrimination may have worsened
during the recession, which compounds the urgency of a problematic decline in
antidiscrimination enforcement. More concretely, regardless of whether dis-
crimination actually increased over the past six years, the number of discrimi-
nation charges filed with the EEOC (whether meritorious or not) grew dramati-
cally during this period, just as recessionary federal budget cuts limited the
tween 200o and 2013, and then averaging the multiplier over this period. Note that
this is a rough comparison: because the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
data category does not specify the statutory basis for all "civil rights" "employ-
ment" lawsuits filed, such cases may likely include claims under statutes beyond
just those enforced by the EEOC.
59. By documenting the historical development of the enforcement mechanisms of
Title VII, I do not mean to imply that the decreasing access to federal courts, see
infra Part III, is problematic because it contravenes congressional intent in passing
Title VII, but that, instead, it is especially problematic in light of congressional de-
sign placing the bulk of enforcement on private actors' shoulders. In fact, limiting
the EEOC's enforcement power and relying on the private right of action was a
strategy used by opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to limit its overall reach,
see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 18-21, a strategy made all the more effective
by recent procedural decisions limiting access to federal courts, see infra Part III.
6o. See infra Part II.A.
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EEOC's capacity to respond.6 ' For antidiscrimination enforcement to be effec-
tive, the agency must both weed out meritless claims expeditiously and pursue
legitimate claims vigorously. Instead, the sole federal agency charged with en-
forcing federal employment antidiscrimination law now faces an unprecedented
strain, diminishing its ability to accomplish either task.
A. Increased Inequality in the Great Recession
Economic inequality, particularly along racial lines, likely increased during
and in the wake of the 20o8 recession. Data on job losses and gains during the
recession and compelling recent social science data indicating such trends are,
of course, not absolutely probative of an increase in actionable workplace dis-
crimination during this time. Nevertheless, such evidence does support a rea-
sonable inference that the need for antidiscrimination enforcement may have
increased in the past six years. Indeed, advocates and media outlets have docu-
mented racial differences in how people have experienced the recession6 and
that the recession has deepened economic inequality between racial groups.6"
One source of relevant data is economic data on unemployment, and par-
ticularly race and sex differences in job losses and gains over the past six years.
When the U.S. economic recession began in late 2007, the country entered a pe-
riod marked by deep job losses and near record high unemployment.6 4 Data
61. See infra Part II.B.
62. See, e.g., Kevin A. Hassett, Racial Recession, NAT'L REV. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://
www.nationalreview.com/articles/229444/racial-recession/kevin-hassett; Caroline
Heldman, A Recession for White Americans, a Depression for Black and
Latino Americans, MS. MAGAZINE BLOG (July 28, 2011), http://
msmagazine.com/blog/2O1/O7/28/a-recession-for-white-americans-a-depression
-for-black-and-latino-americans; Amanda Logan & Christian E. Weller, The State
of Minorities: The Recession Issue, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 16, 2009),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/20o9/oi/16/5482/the-state-of
-minorities-the-recession-issue.
63. See, e.g., Rakesh Kochhar, Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, Twenty-to-One; Wealth Gaps
Rise to Record Highs; Between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics, PEW RES. CENTER 1
(July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/o7/SDT-Wealth-Report
_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf; Annie Lowrey, Wealth Gap Among Races Has Widened Since
Recession, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
o4/29/business/racial-wealth-gap-widened-during-recession.html; Signe-Mary
McKernan et al., Less Than Equal: Racial Disparities in Wealth Accumulation, URB.
INST. 2-4 (Apr. 2013), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/4128 o2-Less-Than
-Equal-Racial-Disparities-in-Wealth-Accumulation.pdf.
64. See Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, NAT'L BUREAU
ECON. RES. (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.nber.org/dec2oo8.pdf; WSJ Staff, NBER
Makes It Official: Recession Started in December 2007, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2008,
12:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/20o8/12/o1/nber-makes-it-official
-recession-started- in-december-200 7.
33 :119 2014
RIGHTS IN RECESSION: TOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
from the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the
impact of job losses during the recession was felt most deeply by African-
American and Latino workers.6" As the U.S. unemployment rate grew steadily
between 2007 and 2010, the unemployment rate for white and Asian workers
grew by about 4.5 percentage points;66 for African-American and Latino work-
ers, unemployment climbed 1.5 to 2 times as steeply, growing by around 7 per-
centage points.6 7 Thus, when unemployment reached its height in 2010, the un-
employment rate for white workers was 8.7%; for African Americans, it was
16%.68
Moreover, the gains in economic recovery to date have been unevenly dis-
tributed by race and gender. For instance, when unemployment rates began to
drop during the recovery in 2011 and 2012, unemployment rates dropped most
quickly for white men, indicating greater hiring rates for men than for women,
and for white men than for African-American men.6 9 While early job losses fell
more heavily on men than women, leading some to describe the recession as a
65. See Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2007, BUREAU LAB. STAT. 4
tbl.i (Sept. 2008), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2007.pdf; Labor Force Character-
istics by Race and Ethnicity, 2oo8, BUREAU LAB. STAT. 5 tbl.i (Nov. 2009),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2oo8.pdf; Labor Force Characteristics by Race and
Ethnicity, 2009, BUREAU LAB. STAT. 5 tbl.1 (Aug. 2010), http://www.bls.gov/cps/
cpsrace2oo9.pdf; Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2oo, BUREAU
LAB. STAT. 5 tbl.i (Aug. 2011), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace201o.pdf.
66. For white workers, between 2007 and 201o, the unemployment rate grew by 4.6
percentage points from 4.1 to 8.7% unemployment; for Asian workers, it grew by
4.3 percentage points from 3.2 to 7.5% unemployment. See supra note 65.
67. For African-American workers, between 2007 and 2010, the unemployment rate
grew by 7.7 percentage points from 8.3 to 16.o% unemployment; for Latino work-
ers, it grew by 6.9 percentage points from 5.6 to 12.5% unemployment. See supra
note 65.
68. See Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2010, supra note 65, at 5 tbl.1.
69. See Employment Status by Hispanic Ethnicity and Detailed Ethnic Group, BUREAU
LAB. STAT. (2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaato6.pdf; Employment Status by
Race, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaato5.pdf; Labor Force
Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2o11, BUREAU LAB. STAT. 5-6 tbls.1, 2 (Aug.
2012), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2011.pdf. Between 201o and 2012, the unem-
ployment rate for all men dropped by 1.7 percentage points and for white men by
2.2 percentage points (from 1o.5 to 8.2% and from 9.6 to 7.4% respectively). Id. In
contrast, the unemployment rate for all women dropped only 0.7 percentage
points (from 8.6 to 7.9%). Id.; see also Dylan Matthews, The Recovery Is Racist,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2o13/o9/o6/the-recovery-is- racist; Ron Scherer, Recovering US lob
Market Is Leaving Black Men Behind, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 26, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2o11/o726/Recovering-US-job-market-is
-leaving-black-men-behind; The African-American Labor Force in the Recovery,
U.S. DEP'T LAB. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.dol.gov/-sec/media/reports/
BlackLaborForce/BlackLaborForce.pdf.
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"mancession, '"7 the jobs women kept were lower paid, and the job gains since
20o have come more quickly for men.'
Racial disparities among the unemployed are compounded by another
trend during the recovery: hiring discrimination based on unemployment sta-
tus. Unemployment status is not a "protected classification" entitled to legal
protection under federal antidiscrimination law (like race, color, national
origin, sex, or religion). 72 But if employers are increasingly discriminating
against job applicants because they are or were recently unemployed-a prob-
lem pervasive enough that it has sparked legislative efforts in nearly half the
states and at the federal level7 3-this may have a disproportionately negative
impact on African-American and Latino applicants, who are more likely to be
unemployed. Recent legal scholarship has identified the potential for such
workers to allege unemployment discrimination as a Title VII discrimination
70. See Joan C. Williams & Allison Tait, "Mancession" or "Momcession"?: Good Provid-
ers, a Bad Economy, and Gender Discrimination, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 857, 860-62
(2011) (describing the media coverage identifying a "mancession").
71. See id. at 876-78 (discussing the criticism of women's relative advantage during
the recession); Jenna Goudreau, Mancession or Momcession?, FORBES (May 11,
2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2oao/o5/11/jobs-recession
-economy-women-earnings-mancession-momcession; Rakesh Kochhar, In Two
Years of Economic Recovery, Women Lost Jobs, Men Found Them, PEW RES. CENTER
(July 6, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/fdles/2o11/o7/Employment-by-
GenderFINAL_7-6-11.pdf; Understanding the Economy: Working Mothers in the
Great Recession, U.S. CONG. J. ECON. COMM. (May 2010), http://www.jec
.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=8221627o-c7fo-46bf -a54f- 6ab22iac586f;
see also supra note 69 (showing a rapid decrease in the unemployment rate for
white men in 2011 and 2012).
72. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe to -e17 (2012).
73. See Winnie Hu, When Being Jobless Is a Barrier to Finding a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/o2/18/nyregion/for-many-being-out-of
-work-is-chief-obstacle-to-finding- it.html; Discrimination Against the Unem-
ployed, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 24, 2013), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/labor-and-employment/discrimination-against-the-unemployed
.aspx (citing related legislation introduced in twenty-four states and D.C. and at
the federal level since 2011); Briefing Paper: Hiring Discrimination Against the Un-
employed, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (July 12, 2011), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/
UI/2oil/unemployed.discrimination.7.12.2on.pdf; Jasmine A. Williams, "Unem-
ployed (and Black) Need Not Apply": A Discussion of Unemployment Discrimina-
tion, Its Disparate Impact on the Black Community, and Proposed Legal Remedies,
56 How. L.J. 629, 657-59 & 658-59 n.181 (2013) (citing legislation in New Jersey,
Florida, California, Ohio, and as part of the federal Jobs Act of 2011).
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claim under a disparate impact theory,7 4 and the EEOC held a public Commis-
sion meeting on this issue.75
Social scientific research provides a second source of data indicating that
workplace inequality may have increased during the recession. Developed in the
late 196os and early 1970s, "realistic group conflict theory" explains how "realis-
tic threats (i.e., competition for scarce resources) increase.., in-group bias
while simultaneously increasing hostility toward out-group members"76 : when
faced with a perceived "threat" (such as a scarcity of jobs), individuals are more
likely to be biased toward people with whom they identify (their "in-group").
Even the perception or prediction of competition-whether real or not-may
increase hostility toward those "out-group" members, who are perceived to be
the cause of the threat.77 Numerous researchers have documented how realistic
group conflict theory applies to a variety of resource-related "threats" to in-
group members and shapes their attitudes toward "organizational, structural,
and societal policies" that may benefit out-groups. 7 Of particular relevance to
recessionary attitudes, existing studies have documented how changes in eco-
nomic conditions and job opportunities affect attitudes toward members of ra-
cial minorities79 and immigration policy."
74. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Excluding Unemployed Workers from Job Opportunities:
Why Disparate Impact Protections Still Matter, 2011 HASTINGS L.J. VOIR DIRE i; Wil-
liams, supra note 73, at 649-50.
75. U.S. EEOC, Meeting of February 16, 2ou11-EEOC to Examine Treatment of Unem-
ployed Job Seekers (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-16-n/
index.cfm.
76. Eden B. King, Jennifer L. Knight & Michelle R. Hebl, The Influence of Economic
Conditions on Aspects of Stigmatization, 66 J. Soc. ISSUES 446, 447 (2010) (citing
and describing R.A. LEVINE & D. T. CAMPBELL, ETHNOCENTRISM: THEORIES OF
CONFLICT, ETHNIC ATTITUDES, AND GROUP BEHAVIOR (1972)). See generally
MUZAFER SHERIF, GROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: THEIR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1966); MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT: INTERGROUP
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1988).
77. Lawrence Bobo, Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group
Conflict?, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1194 (1983).
78. See King, Knight & Hebl, supra note 76, at 447-48 (describing studies from the
198os, 199os, and 2ooos).
79. See, e.g., David A. Butz & Kumar Yogeeswaranb, A New Threat in the Air: Macroe-
conomic Threat Increases Prejudice Against Asian Americans, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 22 (2011); Alexandra Filindra & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, To-
gether in Good Times and Bad? How Economic Triggers Condition the Effects of In-
tergroup Threat, 94 Soc. SCI. Q. 1328 (2013); King, Knight & Hebl, supra note 76, at
447-48; William W. Maddux et al., When Being a Model Minority Is Good... and
Bad: Realistic Threat Explains Negativity Toward Asian Americans, 34 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (20o8); Blake M. Riek et al., Intergroup Threat and Out-
group Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review, lo PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 336
(20o6); Stephanie Seguino & James Heintz, Monetary Tightening and the Dynamics
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Realistic group conflict theory has recently been used to test attitudes dur-
ing periods of economic recession. In one such study, industrial-organizational
psychologist Eden King and her colleagues gave participants information about
the state of the economy and a particular company, and then asked participants
to review and rank candidates for an open marketing position in the company;
candidates were identical in qualifications but different by race and gender.'
When told that the economy and company finances were in decline, partici-
pants were more likely to value the "traditional applicant"-a white male-and
rated him more positively, while rating the Latina candidate significantly more
negatively.2 Conversely, when told that the economy and company finances
were in an upswing, participants were more likely to value diverse applicants."
As a result of these and related manipulations, the researchers concluded that
"[r]atings and rankings of diverse job applicants confirm that economic condi-
tions can directly affect stigmatization in selection decisions.' 8 4 These findings,
the researchers noted, "indicate[] that vigilance in addressing discrimination
may be particularly important in the context of the current turmoil of the world
economy. ""8
In another recent work, social psychologists Amy Krosch and David Amo-
dio tested how economic scarcity alters perceptions of race. The results of their
studies, they contend, "provide strong converging evidence for the role of per-
ceptual bias as a mechanism through which economic scarcity enhances dis-
crimination and contributes to racial disparities."86 As Krosch and Amodio ex-
plain, increased racial disparity during periods of resource scarcity is often
attributed to existing structural disparities (for example, greater layoffs in jobs
that require less education, which are more likely to be held by African Ameri-
of US Race and Gender Stratification, 71 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 603 (2012); Walter G.
Stephan et al., The Role of Threats in Racial Attitudes of Blacks and Whites: An Inte-
grated Threat Theory Analysis, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1242 (2002).
8o. See, e.g., Victoria M. Esses et al., Intergroup Competition and Attitudes Toward
Immigrants and Immigration: An Instrumental Model of Group Conflict, 54 J. Soc.
ISSUES 699 (1998); Lincoln Quillian, Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group
Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Eu-
rope, 60 AM. Soc. REV. 586 (1995); Walter G. Stephan et al., Prejudice Toward Im-
migrants, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2221 (1999); Walter G. Stephan et al., The
Effects of Feeling Threatened on Attitudes Toward Immigrants, 29 INT'L J.
INTERCULTURAL REL. 1 (2005).
81. King, Knight & Hebl, supra note 76, at 450-51.
82. Id. at 452-53, 455.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 455.
85. Id. at 446.
86. See Amy R. Krosch & David M. Amodio, Economic Scarcity Alters the Perception of
Race, 111 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 9079, 9079-84 (2014).
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cans).8" But social scientific research has also suggested that scarcity affects per-
ceptions of-and behaviors toward-in-groups and out-groups.88 Building up-
on this body of work, the researchers conducted four studies to identify
"[h]ow... scarcity effects on social perception [might] contribute to widening
racial disparities during economic recession."8 9 In two studies, participants-
most of whom self-identified as white-were asked to identify the race of a
mixed-race person. When the participants either believed in zero-sum scarcity
or were primed to think about scarcity while completing the task, participants
perceived mixed-race faces as "'Blacker' than their objective racial content."90 In
two other studies, participants who were asked to allocate resources (ten dol-
lars) represented African-American recipients as "Blacker" when the resources
were framed as scarce, which in turn affected discriminatory resource alloca-
tion.91 These findings indicate, the researchers explain, that "scarcity motivates
perceivers to exaggerate the Afrocentric appearance of an African-American
face, which in turn supports the goal of distributing resources in favor of one's
own group."92 These results were also consistent with other research on how
"scarcity is cognitively taxing," making it harder for an individual to moderate
and overcome "unintended prejudices." 93 Krosch and Amodio suggest that their
results show "pernicious" and widespread "destabilizing effects of scarcity on
society" that present "a new challenge to efforts aimed at reducing discrimina-
tion .94
Data on racial and gender differences in job losses and gains since 2007,
when viewed together with social scientific research documenting that resource
scarcity exacerbates underlying biases, support a robust need for enforcement
of federal antidiscrimination law in light of the Great Recession.
B. The Recession's Impact on EEOC Capacity
A separate, but related challenge to antidiscrimination enforcement post-
recession is that, regardless of whether discrimination actually increased, com-
plaints of discrimination to the EEOC (whatever their root cause and whether
meritorious or not) increased dramatically during the 2008 recession. In Part
I.A, racial disparities in job losses and gains and studies on how scarcity exac-
erbates bias were offered to support an inference that the problem of discrimi-
87. Id. at 9079.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 9079-81.
91. Id. at 9o8o-81.
92. Id. at 9o82.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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nation likely worsened during the recession. This Part provides data on in-
creased charges filed with the EEOC, not to further support this inference but,
instead, to show that the EEOC has had to do more enforcement work with
fewer resources during and in the wake of the recession.95
On this point, the data is clear: in each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011, the
EEOC received a new record high number of charges, approaching ioo,ooo per
year. 96 Data from the EEOC's Enforcement Statistics indicate that total charges
to the agency filed rose from 2009 to 2010, and rose slightly more in 2011, before
leveling off in 2012.9' Claims of age discrimination rose in 2008, even before the
worst of the recessionary job losses took effect.9s It is not surprising that dis-
95. Inferring that employers committed more unlawful discrimination during the re-
cession from the fact that more employees filed EEOC charges is problematic. A
closer look at the empirical data on EEOC charges filed during this period tells a
more complex story, showing a jump in claims in 2010, but in the wake of a drop
in claims between 2008 and 2009. Changes in the law in 2008 and 2009-
including the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009), may have contributed to an increase in charge fd-
ings. Terminated employees who face limited prospects for finding new employ-
ment may be more likely to file a complaint than they would be in less economi-
cally dire times. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and
Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 709, 710-11, 717-18 (1993). On the other hand, individuals experienc-
ing discrimination on the job may be less likely to complain out of fear of rocking
the boat during an economic slowdown. A complete empirical analysis of EEOC
charge filing data during the recession and the factors that may have influenced it
is beyond the scope of this Article. What is undeniable, however, is that in the
wake of the Great Recession of 2008, the EEOC received more discrimination
charges to process than ever before in its fifty-year history.
96. See U.S. EEOC, Press Release, Private Sector Bias Charges Hit All-Time High (Jan.
25, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/i-24-12a.cfm; U.S. EEOC,
Press Release, EEOC Reports Job Bias Charges Hit Record High of Nearly loo,ooo in
Fiscal Year 2010 (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/i-i1-
n.cfm; see also Catherine Rampell, More Workers Complain of Bias on the Job, a
Trend Linked to Widespread Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/01/12/business/2bias.html; John W. Schoen, Dismal Job Market Fuels
Job Bias Claims, NBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2011, 2:25 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea
.com/news/business/Dismal-job-market-fuelsjob biasclaims-113294o29.html;
Melanie Trottman, Charges of Bias at Work Increase, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1o001424o52748703791904576o758o2209115 36o.
97. U.S. EEOC, Enforcement and Litigation Statistics, supra note 23. Total charges filed
rose from 93,277 in 2009 to 99,922 in 201o and 99,947 in 2011. Since then, the
number of charges leveled off to 99,412 in 2012 and dropped to 93,727 in 2013, yet
still remain noticeably higher than before the recession (82,792 charges were filed
in 2008). Id.
98. See, e.g., Allison Linn, Age Bias Complaints Surge in Bad Economy, NBC NEWS
(June 29, 2010, 7:47 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/379242ol/ns/businessstocks
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crimination charges would rise in a time of historic layoffs99 and unemploy-
ment, and, no doubt, the number of unmeritorious charges rose, too. Neverthe-
less, even unmeritorious charges require at least some EEOC resources, as each
charge received goes through an intake and initial investigation process before
those deemed lacking in merit are given a "no cause" determination and dis-
missed.0 °
At the same time, recessionary federal budget policies limited the resources
available for the EEOC's public enforcement efforts, magnifying the demands
placed on the agency. The EEOC's budget must be authorized by Congress and
the President each fiscal year, and the level of EEOC staffing for discrimination
charge intake, investigation, and litigation is directly related to its annual fiscal
year budget.10 ' Thus the operating budget of the EEOC--and, therefore, the
number of potential attorneys hired and enforcement actions litigated-is sus-
ceptible to the economy and related budgetary politics. For the first several
years of his presidency, President Obama was able to make good on a promise
to restore budget and staffing levels to the EEOC that had been reduced under
President George W. Bush's administration.' After the EEOC's budget was ef-
fectively frozen at the same level between 2003 and 20o8, and the ceiling for ap-
proved EEOC staff reduced from over 3,000 employees when President Bush
took office to 2,381 employees in 2oo8, the budget was increased in fiscal years
2009 and 20o, raising the approved number of EEOC staff from 2,381 to 2,571.103
The EEOC was, nevertheless, impacted by a budget rescission and staffing cuts
in 2011, and by sequestration and additional staffing cuts in 2013.104 By fiscal year
_and.economy/t/age-bias-complaints-surge-bad-economy; Steve Vogel, Age Dis-
crimination Claims Jump, Worrying EEOC, Worker Advocates, WASH. POST (July
16, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-07-16/politics/367976o21_age
-discrimination-older-workers-eeoc-headquarters.
99. See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 95 (noting increases in federal discrim-
ination lawsuits during economic recessions).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.18-19 (2014); U.S. EEOC, The Charge Handling Process, supra note
53.
iol. See U.S. EEOC, Congressional Oversight, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/legislative/
oversight.cfm; U.S. EEOC, Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Budget Justification (Apr.
2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/214budget.pdf.
102. See Wes Allison, Restore Funding to the EEOC and the U.S. Department of Labor's
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/297/restore
-funding-to-the-eeoc-and-the-us-departmen/; U.S. EEOC, EEOC Budget and
Staffing History 198o to Present, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/planl
budgetandstaffing.cfm.
103. See U.S. EEOC, EEOC Budget and Staffing History 198o to Present, supra note 102.
104. See id.; see also Josh Hicks, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Faces Fur-
loughs If Sequester Continues, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2o13/o3/21/equal-employrnent
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2013, the number of approved EEOC staff dropped to 2,354-ower than under
the Bush administration and the absolute lowest number of approved staff in the
thirty-four years of data published by the EEOC.0 5 This low point in staffing is
all the more noteworthy given that EEOC charge filings reached their fifty-year
apex in 2011.
Not surprisingly, the number of enforcement lawsuits the EEOC has pur-
sued in the years since the recession has also decreased. The number of en-
forcement actions litigated by the EEOC itself is only a small fraction of those
brought by private plaintiffs' attorneys,1o6 but this constraint makes the cases
litigated by the EEOC all the more important: given extremely limited re-
sources, each EEOC case is selected for its potential impact in advancing the law
or redressing systemic harms.'07 Yet despite the dramatic increase in charges
filed with the EEOC since 2008, the number of lawsuits filed by the EEOC has
dropped significantly during the same period. Between 20o and 2008, the
EEOC filed between 325 and 428 lawsuits each year. In contrast, in each of the
years since 2009, the agency filed fewer than 325 lawsuits."' 8 In 2013, the number
of lawsuits filed dropped to only 148-the absolute lowest number of lawsuits
filed per year in 17 years of data published by the EEOC.' 9
Viewed together, the empirical data of the EEOC's operations since the be-
ginning of the Great Recession of 2oo8 paint a stark picture: public enforcement
of federal antidiscrimination law is on the ropes. Discrimination charges filed
with the EEOC have reached their all-time high, just when EEOC staffing and
EEOC lawsuits filed have reached their lowest point in recent history. An eco-
nomic recovery has the potential to counter both trends, yet this potential is
unlikely to come to fruition any time soon. Businesses are often slow to resume
growth and hiring in the wake of a major recession, part of a phenomenon
-opportunity-commission- faces- furloughs-if-sequester-continues; Eric Katz,
EEOC Considers New Wave of Furloughs, GoV'T EXEC. (July 2, 2013), http://www
.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2o13/o7/eeoc-considers-new-wave-furloughs/6596o.
105. See U.S. EEOC, EEOC Budget and Staffing History 198o to Present, supra note 102.
Between 198o and 2001, the budget ceiling for the number of EEOC employees
ranged from a low of 2,68o (in 1998) to a high of 3,740 (in 1982). The approved
staff for FY 2014 dropped further, just very slightly, to 2,347. Id.
lo6. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
107. See U.S. EEOC, Office of the General Counsel, Regional Attorney's Manual, Part
2.IV, C. Presentation Memoranda n.3, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/
manual/2-4-c pms.cfm (describing the justification required by EEOC attorneys
seeking approval to litigate a case: "Include a discussion of whether the claims
recommended for litigation raise strategic or emerging issues or National En-
forcement Plan priorities, and how the case fits within your office's litigation
docket. In addition, where applicable, identify whether the case involves an un-
derserved population or would be filed in an underserved geographic area").
io8. U.S. EEOC, EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 57.
lo9. Id.
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known as "economic scarring.".... Likewise, discretionary federal agency budg-
ets, like that of the EEOC, have suffered long-term consequences from the re-
cession and are unlikely to return to pre-recession amounts anytime soon." ' At
least for the near future, the EEOC will likely have to do more with less.
III. RECEDING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT: THE DIMINISHING PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION, 2007-2013
During the same time period that the economy was in recession, exacerbat-
ing demand on public enforcement, the Supreme Court decided a series of key
cases that created a "procedural recession" within the private right of action
guaranteed to individual employees under Title VII."2 In decisions between
2007 and 2013 in three key areas-civil pleading standards, mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements, and class action certification-the Court has imposed proce-
dural barriers on an individual's ability to bring a lawsuit in federal court, thus
restricting the private right of action at the core of Title VII's enforcement
scheme. 3 In each area comprising this restriction, dissenting Justices raised
concerns about access to the courts, arguing that procedural changes are likely
11o. See, e.g., Irons, supra note ii.
III. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 12; WHITE HOUSE OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note
12, at 5, 12-14, 21-27, 35-36.
112. I do not mean to suggest that the relationship between these two occurrences is
causal, but rather, that it is correlated. The cause of the "procedural recession" in
the Court is likely the shift in the majority position with the arrival of Justices
Roberts and Alito in 20o6 and 2007. Regardless, the timing of these two recession-
ary phenomena is worth noting: just when the economic recession limited public
enforcement of antidiscrimination law, the procedural recession undermined the
ability of discrimination plaintiffs to seek private legal redress.
113. The Court decided two additional cases that are arguably both procedural and
substantive in nature, addressing when the statute of limitations clock starts tick-
ing within which a plaintiff must file a Title VII complaint. In AT&T v. Hulteen,
556 U.S. 701 (2009), the Court held that an employer applying a seniority calcula-
tion that may have been infected with pre-1979 discrimination at an employee's
retirement today did not constitute a current violation of Title VII. In Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2008), the Court held that the clock for
filing a lawsuit started ticking at the time a discriminatory pay decision was insti-
tuted, not when an employee discovered it or in an ongoing fashion, with each
discriminatory paycheck. Because decisions affecting when a plaintiff may com-
plain would apply equally to an administrative complaint and a lawsuit, they are
beyond the scope of this Article's focus, see supra note 13 and accompanying text
(explaining the omission of substantive cases). Moreover, Hulteen is arguably lim-
ited in its application to female employees who took pregnancy leave from work
prior to 1979, see Hulteen, 556 U.S. at 724 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and Congress
acted to overrule the Ledbetter decision by amending Title VII, see Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
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to affect substantive rights when the statute in question relies on a private right
of action for enforcement." 4
A. Intensified Pleading Standards
In 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases involving mo-
tions to dismiss that changed longstanding pleading requirements under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP" or "Rules"). These decisions in-
creased what is required from a plaintiff in an initial complaint, thus raising the
height of the first hurdle a Title VII litigant must scale in order to purse private
enforcement.
Since the creation of the Rules in 1938-in part to overcome the impedi-
ments to plaintiffs posed by early "code pleading" standards" 5-and the inter-
pretation of Rule 8(a) in the seminal 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson,"6 plaintiffs
and their attorneys had operated under a broad "notice pleading" standard."7
To "state[] a claim for relief' under Rule 8(a), a complaint must include only "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief," along with a basis for jurisdiction and a demand for that relief."' In Con-
ley, in upholding a claim of African-American railroad workers against their
union for violating the right to fair representation under the Railway Labor Act,
the Court interpreted this rule as requiring that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief."" 9 This standard, the Court explained, was necessary to meet the Fed-
eral Rules' goal of construing pleadings "to do substantial justice."'2 °
In 2007, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,'2' the Court departed from fifty
years of precedent applying the notice pleading standard to require something
more of plaintiffs' complaints: "plausibility."'22 In Twombly, the Court reinter-
preted Rule 8(a) and dismissed plaintiffs' antitrust conspiracy case against local
114. See infra text accompanying notes 146, 154, 163, 172, 189-92.
115. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
286, 288-89, 333 (2013) (citing JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 501-53 (ioth ed. 2009)).
116. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
117. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577-78 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
119. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 48.
121. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
122. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
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telephone and internet providers under the Sherman Act.'23 The majority recast
Conley and the body of precedent applying it, reasoning that Conley's language
had been taken out of context.' 4 Instead, the language of Conley was meant to
"describe[] the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint
claims," and not to establish "the minimum standard of adequate pleading to
govern a complaint's survival." ' 5 Having done away with the Conley standard,
the Court articulated its own interpretation of what Rule 8(a) requires: enough
facts that a plaintiffs claims are plausible, not just possible-that the facts al-
leged "plausibly suggest[]" rather than are "merely consistent with" the alleged
claims."z6 Applying this standard to the facts at hand, the Court found that, alt-
hough plaintiffs' claims provided a basis from which a jury could infer that the
defendants had violated the Sherman Act (conspiring to behave the same way,
interdependently), because there was another possible explanation for the facts
cited that was perfectly legal (behaving the same way, independently), plaintiffs'
factual support was no longer enough.' Finding that the Twombly plaintiffs
"ha[d] not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,"
the Court dismissed the claim.'"
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,'29 the Court extended its holding in
Twombly beyond the context of antitrust suits, applying its "plausibility" stand-
ard to dismiss the complaint of a Pakistani detainee who alleged he was de-
prived of his constitutional rights and discriminated against when abused in
federal custody.' 3' Revisiting its Twombly test, the Court provided additional
guidance. While the plausibility standard is not a "probability requirement," it
does require "more than a sheer possibility" that the defendant violated the law;
the analysis is "context-specific" and "requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense."' 3'
The Twombly Court's discussion of its 2002 decision in the employment
discrimination case of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 32 is particularly relevant to Title
VII's private right of action. To prove a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must
first allege a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII,
123. Id. at 553.
124. Id. at 562-63.
125. Id. at 563.
126. Id. at 557-58.
127. Id. at 553-57.
128. Id. at 570.
129. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
130. Id. at 684, 669-70 ("Our decision in Twornbly expounded the pleading standard
for 'all civil actions,' . . . and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits
alike.").
131. Id. at 678-79.
132. 534 U.S. 5o6 (2002).
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which shifts the evidentiary burden (temporarily) to the employer.133 In
Swierkiewicz, the Court clarified that a Title VII prima facie case is an "eviden-
tiary standard, not a pleading requirement"; as such, an employment discrimi-
nation complaint need not allege facts establishing a full prima facie case of dis-
crimination to survive a motion to dismiss.3 4 Revisiting this decision in
Twombly, the Court distinguished Swierkiewicz by noting that that decision did
not address the law of pleading generally, but rather struck down a particular
heightened pleading standard that had been impermissibly applied by the court
of appeals to dismiss a plaintiffs employment discrimination complaint.'35 The
implication was that Swierkiewicz's complaint itself alleged enough facts to
meet the Twombly "plausibility" standard, which is less than the "heightened"
prima facie pleading standard at issue in Swierkiewicz . 6 For employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs, then, the question is what, after Twombly and Iqbal, re-
mains of Swierkiewicz137: if a plaintiff need not plead a full prima facie case of
employment discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, where is the line be-
tween discrimination being "merely" a "possible" explanation for an adverse
employment action (which may be dismissed under Twombly and Iqbal) and
being a "plausible" explanation (which will not)?138
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions have generated a colossal amount of
scholarship, even a partial survey of which is beyond the scope of this Article. 139
A sampling of key civil procedure scholarship on the two cases provides a range
of opinions on their impact on plaintiffs' complaints.'4° Empirical studies of the
impact of Twombly and Iqbal on overall dismissal rates paint a similarly murky
133. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
134. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
135. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007) (discussing
Swierkiewicz).
136. Id. at 570.
137. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1618-21 (2001).
138. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-58. See
generally Sullivan, supra note 137 (discussing post-Twombly and Iqbal pleading
strategies in employment discrimination cases).
139. A recent Westlaw search generated over 16oo law review articles citing Twombly
and over 1200 citing Iqbal.
140. See Miller, supra note 115, at 331-39, 346-47 (describing the two cases as "a proce-
dural 'sea change' in plaintiffs' ability to survive the pleading stage" with "dra-
matic" effects, potentially merging motions to dismiss with motions for summary
judgment); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to
Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1713 (2013) (describing and responding
to scholarship arguing that the two cases "did not fundamentally change pleading
doctrine" or had a "negligible if not nonexistent" impact).
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picture. 4' As applied to employment discrimination claims specifically, the
scholarship has been more consistently pessimistic about the prospects for
plaintiffs.' 42 Plausible pleading is particularly difficult for discrimination plain-
tiffs in the employment context, given the information asymmetry between
employers (who have knowledge of their own practices, policies, and motiva-
tions) and employees (who cannot access this information without the discov-
ery that comes if they survive a motion to dismiss). 43 And, while empirical
studies of the impact on all types of complaints may be inconclusive, the same
cannot be said of discrimination complaints specifically: several studies have
documented empirically that Twombly and Iqbal have increased dismissal rates
for civil rights cases, '44 and one scholar suggests an even greater negative impact
on cases in which African-American plaintiffs allege race discrimination.' 45
Whether Twombly and Iqbal will lead to a significant reduction in the number
of federal lawsuits that proceed beyond the pleading stage remains to be seen.
Regardless, it is safe to say that, for Title VII-a statute in which the chief
141. See Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still out for
Civil Rights and Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 727-43
(2013) (discussing the many empirical studies and their criticisms); see also JOE S.
CECIL, et al., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011); DODSON, supra note 21, at 83-1o6; Patricia
Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6)
Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 604-07 (2012); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and
Iqbal's Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to
Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011).
142. See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 141, at 721 n.lo (discussing employment related
scholarship); Trial by jury or Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Em-
ployment Discrimination, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www
.nylslawreview.com/trial-by-jury-or-trial-by-motion-summary-judgment-iqbal
-and-employment-discrimination.
143. See DODSON, supra note 21, at 1O8-12; Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly
to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6o DUKE L.J. 1
(2010); Miller, supra note 115, at 340-43.
144. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and lqbal Mat-
ter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 597, 6o9, 630 tbl.D (2010) (noting compara-
tively higher rate of dismissals in Title VII cases than in other types of cases);
Moore, supra note 141, at 618-19 (same); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common
Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal's Effect on Claims of Race Discrimina-
tion, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 4, 35-38 (2011) (documenting increased rate of dismis-
sal after Iqbal); Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New Means to
Measure Civil Procedure 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 187, 189, 205-207 (2013) (same). But
see generally David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of
Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (discussing impact of empirical
methodology on results in body of work assessing impact of Twombly and lqbal).
145. See Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense, supra note 144; Quintanilla, Critical Race
Empiricism, supra note 144.
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mechanism for enforcement is a private right of action-the result of intensi-
fied pleading standards is unlikely to be more rigorous enforcement.
Justice Stevens suggested as much in his Twombly dissent when-noting
that provisions for attorneys' fees and treble damages written into the Sherman
Act (under which the Twombly plaintiffs brought suit) "indicate[] that Con-
gress intended to encourage, rather than discourage, private enforcement of the
law"-he warned that, in such cases, "[iut is... more, not less, important.., to
resist the urge to engage in armchair economics at the pleading stage."'' 6 Given
congressional design that leaves the lion's share of antidiscrimination enforce-
ment to federal court determinations of employee-initiated complaints, the
same can be said of cases arising under Title VII.
B. Increased Mandatory Individual Arbitration
A second area of recent U.S. Supreme Court procedural precedent that has
curtailed Title VII's private right of action is mandatory arbitration. Beginning
in 2009, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that enforced the manda-
tory nature of predispute arbitration agreements over assertions that the con-
sumer and employee plaintiffs had had little choice but to accept such agree-
ments. In these decisions, the Court separated the existence of a statutory right
(i.e., antidiscrimination protections provided by Title VII) from the judicial fo-
rum in which that statutory right may be heard (i.e., private arbitration or fed-
eral court). As dissenting Justices in these cases pointed out, however, this dis-
tinction is particularly problematic when the chief enforcement mechanism of
the underlying statute is a private right of action.
In 2009, the Court significantly shifted its position on the enforceability of
mandatory predispute arbitration agreements that require arbitration of indi-
vidual federal statutory rights. In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,'47 the plaintiffs, a
group of building night watchmen and members of the Service Employees In-
ternational Union (SEIU), suspected age discrimination when their employer
reassigned them from security jobs to less lucrative porter and janitor posi-
tions.'4 The SEIU and the plaintiffs' employer's realty business association had
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), requiring that all employ-
ment discrimination claims be subject to mandatory arbitration-"the sole and
exclusive remedy for violations" of the statutes related to the plaintiffs'
claims.'4 9 Because their union had agreed to the provision and was unable to
146. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 587 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454, for the proposition
that, where "Congress itself has placed the private.., litigant in a most favorable
position.., this Court should not add requirements to burden the private litigant
beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress in those laws").
147. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
148. Id. at 251-53.
149. Id. at 251-52.
146
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help, the plaintiffs filed charges under the federal Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA) with the EEOC and attempted to pursue their claims in
court. In response, the employer moved to compel arbitration under the
CBA.15° The Court distinguished and distanced itself from long-standing prece-
dent that a union may not waive a judicial forum for an individual statutory
employment right. 15' Instead, the Court held that, because the "agreement to
arbitrate statutory antidiscrimination claims [was] 'explicitly stated"' in the
CBA, it was enforceable; 5 there was no legal difference between "arbitration
agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union
representative.' 153
Justice Souter dissented, highlighting-just as Justice Stevens had done in
his Twornbly dissent-the important role of the private right of action in en-
forcing the underlying statutory law. Rejecting clear prior precedent that pro-
hibited a union from waiving an individual's statutory right, he argued, was
particularly ill-suited to federal antidiscrimination statutes given the "vital ele-
ment" of those statutes' private right of action-which was necessary both to
redress individual injury and to "vindicat[e] the important congressional policy
against discriminatory employment practices."'54
Having drawn a clear line separating statutory rights from judicial fora, the
Court majority set off on a path of related decisions in the four years that fol-
lowed Pyett, making predispute arbitration agreements increasingly mandatory.
In 2o10,' 55 in Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson,156 the Court held that an em-
ployee who was required to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of get-
ting hired could be compelled to arbitrate even his challenge to the enforceabil-
ity of the mandatory predispute arbitration agreement in question.1 57 The
150. Id. at 254.
151. Id. at 26o-61, 263-66, 268 (distinguishing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974)).
152. Id. at 258.
153. Id. at 281 (citation omitted).
154. Id. at 278 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
155. In 2010, the Court also decided Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), holding that where two parties stipulated that they had
not agreed on whether their arbitration clause included class claims, an arbitrator
who ordered class arbitration exceeded his authority under the FAA. While the
majority opinion evinces hostility to class arbitration that may bear relation to the
general trend I am analyzing, see id. at 685-86, I have omitted a discussion of this
case, because it focuses more on the scope of an arbitrator's authority than on en-
forceability of an arbitration agreement.
156. 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
157. Id. at 65-68, 73-75. The Court did note that "had Jackson challenged [only] the
delegation provision by arguing that [the fee-sharing provision] as applied to the
delegation provision rendered that provision unconscionable, the challenge should
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following year, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,158 the Court upheld a
mandatory predispute arbitration agreement in the consumer context, despite
the fact that the agreement waived the ability to pursue claims on a class basis-
making it unlikely that any attorney would agree to pursue the case. The plain-
tiffs purchased cell phone service from AT&T that was advertised as including a
free cell phone, but were charged $30.22 in sales tax on the estimated value of
the phone.'1 9 When they sought to pursue a class claim for false advertising and
fraud, the Court upheld the enforceability of a broad arbitration clause in the
contract they were required to sign to obtain cell service that required all dis-
putes be brought in individual, not "purported class or representative" arbitra-
tion, and which prohibited an arbitrator from consolidating claims or hearing
"any form of... class proceeding."16 ' The plaintiffs challenged the arbitration
agreement as unconscionable under California state law designed to prevent
"cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
money." '61 The Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted
any state law that conflicted with the FAA's "principal purpose" of maximizing
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, which, by requiring class arbitra-
tion, the California precedent did. 6 Yet another dissent raised concern over the
forum's impact on statutory rights: Justice Breyer dissented, noting that requir-
ing individual instead of class arbitration for such small potential damages may
"have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims."'6 3
Most recently, in 2013,164 the Court extended its Concepcion holding on the
preemptive reach of the FAA beyond state law to its own federal precedent. In
have been considered by the court," but that "[tlhat would be, of course, a much
more difficult argument to sustain." Id. at 74 (first emphasis added).
158. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
159. Id. at 1744.
160. Id. at 1744, 1744 n.2 (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 1744-46 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 11oo (Cal. 2005)).
162. Id. at 1748, 1750 (citations omitted) ("Although § 2's saving clause preserves gener-
ally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-
law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objec-
tives.").
163. Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. In 2013, the Court also decided Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064
(2013), unanimously upholding an arbitrator's ruling that class arbitration was
available where an arbitration agreement was silent on the issue of class claims
and the parties agreed to submit that specific question to the arbitrator. As with
2010'S Stolt-Nielsen, while Justice Alito's concurrence indicates hostility to class
arbitration that may be relevant to my argument, see 133 S. Ct. at 2071-72, because
the case focuses more on the scope of an arbitrator's authority than the enforcea-
bility of an arbitration agreement, I have omitted a discussion of it.
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American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,165 a group of business owners
filed a class action lawsuit against American Express alleging antitrust violations
under the Sherman Act based on fees they incurred as a result of accepting
American Express cards.'66 As in Concepcion, the plaintiffs' service agreements
with American Express contained an arbitration clause requiring "all disputes
between the parties to be resolved by arbitration," and prohibiting any arbitra-
tion "on a class action basis."'6 7 The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable because the cost of expert testimony to prove
their allegations (hundreds of thousands to one million dollars or more) would
far exceed the maximum damages each individual could possibly receive (no
more than $39,000).168 Building upon its holding in Concepcion, the Court held
that an arbitration agreement was enforceable, absent a clear intention by Con-
gress to preclude waiver of a judicial forum in a particular statute. 16 9 The Court
distinguished and distanced itself from an earlier decision in which it had rec-
ognized an "effective vindication" exception to the FAA that could render an
arbitration agreement unenforceable if it "operat[ed] ... as a prospective waiver
of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies.' 70 Appearing to sever any con-
nection remaining between choice of judicial forum and statutory rights, the
Court explained that "the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in prov-
ing a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue
that remedy." 171 Writing for the dissent-as Justices Souter and Breyer had done
before her, Justice Kagan warned that the majority had dismantled the "mecha-
nism" that "prevent[s] arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff's ability
to enforce congressionally created rights," constituting "a betrayal.., of federal
statutes like the antitrust laws," and setting off down the wrong road-one of
poorer enforcement of federal statutes.'
172
As with the impact of intensified pleading standards, that of the Court's
suite of mandatory arbitration decisions on the ability of plaintiffs to seek legal
redress remains to be seen. Recent legal scholarship has described the Court's
expansive reading of congressional intent behind the FAA as posing a serious
threat to access to the courts.'73 In terms of Title VII's private right of action, the
165. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
166. Id. at 2308.
167. Id. (citations omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2308-09.
170. Id. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).
171. Id. at 2311.
172. Id. at 2313, 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
173. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake ofAT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629-30 (2012);
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impact is likely to be stark. When Congress, in drafting Title VII, purposely cur-
tailed the reach and power of the EEOC and denied the EEOC adjudicatory
power (which many other federal agencies have) over private employment dis-
putes, the goal was to leave determinations of discrimination to the federal
courts.Y7 4 As Title VII-and alternative dispute resolution-evolved over time,
Congress specifically included a section in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that "en-
couraged" alternative dispute resolution of Title VII claims, "[w] here appropri-
ate and to the extent authorized by law."'75 Yet Congress also maintained the
primary importance of a plaintiff's private right of action, enhancing enforce-
ment through increased damages available to private plaintiffs and their attor-
neys under the statuteY76 Today, it is long settled under the FAA that a plain-
tiffs claims arising under a federal statute-including federal
antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII and the ADEA-may fall under an
arbitration agreement and need not be heard by a federal courtY'7 But there is a
world of difference between Congress encouraging resolution of federal statuto-
ry claims through private dispute resolution and the Court's recent precedent
compelling mandatory arbitration on an individual basis at the risk of foreclos-
ing a plaintiffs ability to assert a federal statutory right. Indeed, in the 1991 Su-
preme Court decision affirming the arbitrability of federal antidiscrimination
claims, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,zs the Court based its ruling on
the fact that "arbitration agreements ... serve to advance the objective of allow-
ing [claimants] a broader right to select the forum for resolving disputes, wheth-
er it be judicial or otherwise.' 7 9
For employment discrimination plaintiffs, particularly those earning low
wages who may not be able to find an attorney to represent them without a pu-
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 815-22
(2013); Miller, supra note 115 at 327-31; Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704, 720- 27
(2012).
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 259 n.6 (2009) (citing Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1O81); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (discussing the congressional intent regarding
arbitration of ADEA claims).
176. See supra Part I.C.
177. See infra Part III.B; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 ("It is by now clear that statutory claims
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the
FAA.. . . '[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
178. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
179. Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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tative class claim, the Court's recent holdings allow employers to require
agreements that make arbitration so "unavailable or pointless" that they are, in
effect, "backdoor waivers of statutory rights. ""'° This includes the private right
of action essential to the enforcement of Title VII.
C. Limited Class Employment Discrimination Claims
In addition to decisions on pleading requirements and mandatory arbitra-
tion, recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent in a third area-class certification
rules-has constrained Title VII's private right of action."' In 2011, in Wal-Mart
v. Dukes,8 2 a group of employees sued Wal-Mart, alleging sex discrimination in
pay and promotion and seeking to represent a class of 1.5 million current and
former female employees. At issue was Wal-Mart's challenge to the plaintiffs'
motion for class certification, which the district and appellate courts had grant-
ed.8 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
denied the motion for class certification;8 4 in so doing, the Court narrowed
prior interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs the
requirements for class certification.
The Court held that to determine if plaintiffs have met Rule 23(a)(2)'s re-
quirement of "commonality," the relevant inquiry of whether "there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class" involves whether class treatment
would "generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litiga-
tion."'8 s Moreover, in assessing the commonality question, the Court could look
beyond certification issues and look toward the merits of the case. 86 Here, the
plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart engaged in a company-wide policy of allowing
local manager discretion in setting pay and promotions that, because of the
"uniform 'corporate culture' permit[ting] bias against women," was exercised
in a way that disadvantaged female employees; company executives knew this
and did nothing to correct the problem. 18 7 The Court majority discounted
18o. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
181. In 2013, the Court also decided two cases involving class certification rules, Corn-
cast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) and Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &
Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). Both affirmed and applied Wal-Mart v. Dukes;
yet because the significant limitations on Title VII's private right of action had al-
ready been established under Wal-Mart v. Dukes, discussion of these cases is omit-
ted.
182. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
183. Id. at 2549.
184. Id. at 2561.
185. Id. at 2548, 2550-51 (internal citation omitted).
186. Id. at 2551-52.
187. Id. at 2548.
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plaintiffs' social framework and statistical expert evidence and held that, be-
cause plaintiffs lacked "some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those [dis-
criminatory] decisions together," they failed to prove commonality under Rule
23(a)(2)."'
Writing for the dissent, Justice Ginsburg criticized this holding as going too
far into the merits at the class certification stage and merging analysis under
Rule 23(a) with that of Rule 23 (b)(3). s9 Instead, she argued, the record support-
ed the existence of a common question: whether Wal-Mart's uniform policy
and "system of delegated discretion ... produce[] discriminatory outcomes"-a
question that had been held to be actionable under Title VII.' 9° Even if the class
members had "unique circumstances" that entitled them to individual relief,
the question of which type of class action plaintiffs could bring "should not fac-
tor into the Rule 23(a)(2) determination."' 9'
The Court also held, unanimously on this issue, that the case could not be
certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which allows plaintiffs to proceed automatically
on behalf of all members of the relevant class.192 Instead, cases that seek mone-
tary damages that are more than "incidental" to injunctive relief must proceed
under Rule 23 (b)(3)-which requires plaintiffs to provide notice to class mem-
bers and allow them to opt out of the class-even if the monetary relief does
not "predominate" over the injunctive claims.'93 Although unanimous, this rul-
ing was also novel: the Court had not previously weighed in on this issue, and
plaintiffs in some circuits had successfully brought class actions seeking some
monetary relief without having to follow the notice and opt-out requirements
of Rule 23 (b)(3). 194
Once again, the full reach of Wal-Mart v. Dukes on potential class action
plaintiffs has yet to be seen. For the most part, legal scholars have predicted
that, while the case may be distinguishable by its unusually large class size, it
will still have a limiting impact on class action employment litigation.1 95 As it
188. Id. at 2552, 2554-55.
189. Id. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19o. Id. at 2567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
191. Id (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 2557-58; id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2557-58.
194. Id. at 2559 ("In the context of a class action predominantly for money damages we
have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process .... While we
have never held that to be so where the monetary claims do not predominate, the
serious possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read Rule
23(b)(2) to include the monetary claims here.").
195. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343,
1350-51, 1350-51 n.61 (2014) (describing and citing the body of scholarship that
"denounced the [Wal-Mart] case as one that undermines the rights of workplace
discrimination victims"). But see Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The
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relates to Title VII's private right of action, Wal-Mart imposes still more proce-
dural hurdles for plaintiffs, particularly those earning low wages, seeking to
bring a private lawsuit. Because the EEOC can pursue as complainant only a
fraction of a percent of the charges it receives each year'96 , most employees who
have experienced unlawful discrimination must find a private plaintiffs' attor-
ney to represent them in their enforcement action. Plaintiffs' attorneys general-
ly work on a contingency basis, taking a portion of the damages awarded to the
plaintiffs they represent, in addition to any attorneys' fees they are able to re-
cover; 97 lower-wage employees have lower compensatory damages, often mak-
ing their cases financially viable only if an attorney can pursue their claims on
behalf of a class. With the Court's ruling tightening up class certification under
Rule 23 (b)(2), plaintiffs' attorneys seeking any significant monetary relief now
face the additional costs of providing notice and allowing individuals to opt out
of a potential class. 'g' More importantly, the majority's holding on Rule 23(a)
commonality has the potential to open the door to wider-reaching merits-based
challenges against plaintiffs at the class certification stage.' 99 This uncertainty
adds to the financial risks plaintiffs' attorneys already undertake when filing a
putative class claim. Raising the height of-and the costs to scale-the proce-
dural hurdle of Rule 23 lessens the likelihood that individuals will be able to ex-
ercise their Title VII private right of action; what is more, it threatens to limit
the overall enforcement of antidiscrimination law by deterring private attorneys
from litigating the systemic cases the EEOC is unable to pursue.
When viewed together, the Roberts Court's procedural decisions since 2007
evince a troubling reality: plaintiffs' access to federal courts is being narrowed in
ways that will negatively impact enforcement of statutory antidiscrimination
rights. Federal pleading standards and class certification rules now require more
of plaintiffs earlier, despite the information asymmetry inherent in any employ-
ee-employer dispute. Mandatory predispute arbitration agreements may now
be enforceable, even when they require plaintiffs to waive the class claims that
may provide their only hope of obtaining legal representation. The vast majori-
ty of Title VII enforcement rests upon individuals being willing and able to ex-
ercise their statutory private right of action-an ability now jeopardized by this
"procedural recession."
Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective Employment
Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 435 (2012) (suggesting a more limited
impact given that similar cases make up a small proportion of all employment
discrimination claims).
196. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
197. See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REv.
927, 935-44 (20o6).
198. See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v.
Wal-Mart, 1o6 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 51-52 (2011).
199. See id. at 44-45; Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 500-01 (2011).
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IV. TOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
By statutory design, Congress limited the authority of the EEOC and placed
much of the responsibility for the enforcement of Title VII's antidiscrimination
protections on individual employees through a private right of action. From the
Act's original drafting in 1964, through its amendment in 1972 and 1991, to to-
day, the core of Title VII's enforcement scheme has always been predominantly
private civil lawsuits supplemented by limited public gatekeeping. °° Over the
past six years, and coinciding with the Great Recession of 2008, the Supreme
Court has hamstrung private enforcement efforts by procedurally constricting
plaintiffs' abilities to pursue the private right of action guaranteed under Title
VII.2° ' As a public enforcement agency, the EEOC itself does not rely on the pri-
vate right of action and thus remains mostly free from the constraints of this
case law. Yet with limited enforcement authority and limited funding as a pub-
lic agency, the EEOC alone cannot take full advantage of its unique procedural
advantages.
To overcome the respective challenges of recent economic and procedural
recessions," this Part proposes that private plaintiffs' attorneys and the EEOC
leverage their relative strengths by collaborating in a public-private enforce-
ment partnership. This collaboration would require a reinvigoration of "admin-
istrative antidiscrimination law"-that is, all of the steps and tools available in
the process of enforcement that occurs between an employee filing a charge
with the EEOC and a plaintiffs' attorney filing a private Title VII case in federal
court. Private plaintiffs' attorneys should consider using existing EEOC admin-
istrative procedures like mediation and investigation more robustly, rather than
rushing straight to the courtroom. Doing so may serve to avoid potential early
dismissals (made more likely by Twombly and Iqbal) and potential mandatory
arbitration (made more likely by Pyett and its progeny). Likewise, the EEOC
should consider partnering with private class action plaintiffs' attorneys and
staffing more systemic cases more leanly, to help plaintiffs avoid potential chal-
lenges to class certification (made more likely by Wal-Mart).
Legal scholars have suggested a variety of proposals to revamp the EEOC
and increase antidiscrimination enforcement; yet, for the most part,20 2 the pro-
posals seek to improve upon either a purely private attorney general or a purely
200. See supra Part I.
201. See supra Part III.
202. For other interesting discussion and proposals that go beyond the traditional pri-
vate attorney general/public agency dichotomy see, for example, Engstrom, supra
note 2, at 699-711, which applies agency theory to reconceive the EEOC's role as
litigation gatekeeper and perfects the existing "'hybrid' public-private enforce-
ment model" post Wal-Mart v. Dukes; Green, supra note 2, at 335-57, which pro-
poses private mandatory mediation of EEOC charges; and Modesitt, supra note 2,
at 1274-75, which proposes, among other things, a mediation partnership between
federal courts and the EEOC.
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public agency model (or both) of antidiscrimination enforcement."°3 On the
public agency model side, for example, Professor Michael Waterstone proposed
beefing up existing public agency enforcement through increased public law lit-
igation and diversified "new governance" approaches to redress disability dis-
crimination.2 ° 4 Professor Marcia McCormick proposed the addition of a non-
judicial fact-finding body modeled after the transitional justice concept of a
truth commission.2 5 Professor Julie Suk looked to British law and theories of
distributive justice to revisit giving the EEOC cease-and-desist and other adju-
dicatory authority. °6 On the private attorney general side, in an early work,
Professor Michael Selmi suggested that the EEOC be relieved entirely of its
gatekeeping role, leaving private plaintiffs free from the administrative hurdles
that often harm their private lawsuits."' As a result, Selmi suggested, this could
free up public agency resources to focus on low-value cases not likely to attract
attorney representation, while allowing lawsuits against large employers to pro-
ceed directly to federal court."°' Professor Pam Jenoff later echoed this sugges-
tion in work proposing an expanded adjudicatory role for the EEOC over small
employers.0 9
While each of these well-reasoned suggestions offers the possibility of im-
proved antidiscrimination enforcement, they suffer from three significant limi-
tations in light of recent economic, political, and jurisprudential events. First, to
the extent these proposals seek to expand public agency efforts, they require
more financial resources, an issue that scholars have addressed,210 but which has
now been made all the more difficult post-Great Recession. Second, to the ex-
tent the proposals require congressional authorization to expand EEOC author-
ity, modern legislative gridlock and a lack of political capital on the side of em-
ployee advocates make such amendments highly unlikely. Indeed legislation
directed solely at reversing the three recent procedural constraints imposed by
the Roberts Court-which would require arguably less political capital than leg-
islation expanding EEOC authority overall-has failed to make it beyond the
committee stage.' Lastly, to the extent the proposals rely on or seek to expand
203. See, e.g., Jenoff, supra note 2; McCormick, supra note 2; Modesitt, supra note 2;
Munroe, supra note 2; Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 2, at 708-09; Selmi, supra note
2; Suk, supra note 2; Waterstone, supra note 2.
204. See Waterstone, supra note 2, at 461-65, 479-81, 485-88.
205. See McCormick, supra note 2, at 222-30.
206. See Suk, supra note 2, at 405-09, 467-73.
207. See Selmi, supra note 2, at 3-4, 57-63.
208. See id. at 60-62.
209. See Jenoff, supra note 2, at 119-25.
210. See id. at 121; McCormick, supra note 2, at 230; Selmi, supra note 2, at 63.
211. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, inth Cong. (2010) (to reverse
the impact of Twombly and Iqbal); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th
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the private attorney general model of antidiscrimination enforcement, none
address the constrained access to federal courts in the wake of the Roberts
Court's procedural decisions as described in Part III, above.
In contrast to prior proposals, this Part suggests that, even under existing
law and without requiring significantly more financial resources, a combined
public-private model of "administrative antidiscrimination law" can enhance
antidiscrimination enforcement and overcome limitations imposed by recent
Supreme Court precedent and a slow economy.
A. The EEOC's Advantages in an Era of Receding Private Rights of Action
While the ability of an employee plaintiff to assert her private right of ac-
tion under Title VII has been significantly constrained by the Supreme Court
decisions discussed in Part III, much of this precedent does not apply to the
EEOC as a complainant. As part of its 1972 amendments to improve enforce-
ment under Title VII, Congress delegated specific enforcement authority to the
EEOC.2 This statutory grant is separate from the authority provided to indi-
viduals to enforce Title VII through a private right of action.1 3 As a result, the
procedural requirements for the EEOC's involvement in an antidiscrimination
claim are different from those of private individuals and, therefore, relatively
insulated from the Court's recent narrowing precedent.
1. Charges, Not Pleadings
The first, and most obvious, difference in filing a complaint with the EEOC
and filing a private lawsuit in federal court is in the specificity of what must be
alleged. For a plaintiff to begin the process of filing a private antidiscrimination
lawsuit under Title VII, she must first file a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC and "exhaust" her administrative remedies. 14 Completing an EEOC
charge requires providing the EEOC with basic information on the parties in-
volved and the basis upon which the employee believes he has been discrimi-
nated: by federal regulation, "a written statement sufficiently precise to identify
the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of' is
considered "sufficient" to serve as an EEOC charge." 5 The intake form used to
Cong. (2013) (to exclude employment, civil rights, consumer, and antitrust cases
from mandatory predispute arbitration precedent); Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Restoration Act of 2012, S. 3317, 112th Cong. (2012) (to reverse the impact of
Wal-Mart v. Dukes).
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-4 to -5 (2012); supra Part I.B.
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(f) (2012).
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-5(b) (20012); U.S. EEOC, Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 22.
215. 29C.F.R. § 1601.12 (2014).
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complete the charge includes check boxes and blanks, and contemplates a min-
imum amount of information required to get the EEOC involved." 6
Once the charge is filed, the administrative process begins, including noti-
fying the employer of the charge and investigating the potential discrimina-
tion. 17 This notification alone can have a benefit for the employee by putting
the employer on notice to correct current discriminatory behavior." ' In com-
parison, to file a private lawsuit a plaintiff must file a civil complaint that com-
plies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, most relevant here, the
Court's recent interpretation of "plausibility" under Twombly and Iqbal 9
Of course, once the EEOC's administrative process concludes and an em-
ployee receives a "right to sue letter," should the case remain unresolved and
should the employee wish to file a lawsuit, the civil complaint will still have to
meet the requirements of Rule 8(a). Likewise, the EEOC must also comply with
Rule 8(a) when it files a complaint in federal court on behalf of an individual or
in its own enforcement capacity.2 At that point in the process, however, the
EEOC will already have had the benefit of using all of its resources to complete
a full investigation, making the likelihood of meeting "plausibility" greater at
the outset of the litigation.
Regardless, the plausibility standard has no impact on the simple standard
that remains for completing an EEOC charge, creating an administrative oppor-
tunity between filing a charge with the EEOC and filing a complaint in court in
which an employee may attempt to get early information and relief, free from
the standards imposed by Twornbly and Iqbal.
216. See Selmi, supra note 2, at 7; U.S. EEOC, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Intake Questionnaire, http://www.eeoc.gov/form/upload/Uniform
-Intake-Questionnaire.pdf.
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 16o.14(a) (2014); Hirsh, supra note 53, at
239, 243.
218. See, e.g., Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 4o6-07 (4th Cir.
2013) ("The requirement of filing a charge with the EEOC ... serves two principal
purposes: '. . . it notifies the charged party of the asserted violation . .. and [it]
permits effectuation of the [Civil Rights] Act's primary goal, the securing of vol-
untary compliance with the law.'.. .The filing of an administrative charge, there-
fore, 'is not simply a formality to be rushed through so that an individual can
quickly file his subsequent lawsuit.'... Rather, the charge itself serves a vital func-
tion in the process of remedying an unlawful employment practice.") (citations
omitted).
219. See supra Part III.A.
220. See, e.g., EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007).
157
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2. Not Bound by Arbitration Agreements
In addition, the EEOC is not bound by the terms of any predispute manda-
tory arbitration agreements to which an employee may be subject. In two deci-
sions in which the Court held that employees could be compelled to submit
statutory claims arising under federal antidiscrimination laws to arbitration un-
der the FAA, the Court also clarified that the EEOC was not similarly bound.22'
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, the plaintiff sought to sue his employer for
age discrimination under the ADEA when he was terminated from his position
as a financial services manager. 22 The employer moved to compel arbitration
under an arbitration clause to which the plaintiff had agreed when registering
with several stock exchanges, as required for the position. 3 The Court upheld
the arbitration agreement: because Congress did not express any intent to pre-
clude a waiver of judicial forum under the ADEA, there was no reason why fed-
eral statutory rights under the ADEA could not be subject to arbitration.2 z4 In so
holding, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that compelling arbitration
of claims under the ADEA would undermine the EEOC's enforcement efforts.225
As the Court explained,
An individual ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will
still be free to file a charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is
not able to institute a private judicial action.... In any event, the
EEOC's role in combating age discrimination is not dependent on the
filing of a charge; the agency may receive information concerning al-
leged violations of the ADEA "from any source," and it has independ-
ent authority to investigate age discrimination.226
Because the EEOC's authority to enforce antidiscrimination statutes is in-
dependent from an individual's private right of action, the Court held that an
employee's arbitration agreement has no bearing on the EEOC.227 When the
plaintiff raised a separate concern that mandatory arbitration of ADEA claims
could limit the ability to bring class actions, the Court again invoked the
EEOC's separate authority, noting that "arbitration agreements will not pre-
clude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable re-
lief."28
221. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
222. 500 U.S. at 20, 23-24 (1991).
223. Id. at 23-24.
224. Id. at 25-29.
225. Id. at 28, 32.
226. Id. at 28.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-5 (2012); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
228. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
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A decade later, in EEOC v. Waffle House,229 the Court further clarified how
the EEOC's separate enforcement authority fits with an individual's private
right of action under Title VII when that individual is covered by an arbitration
agreement. When a restaurant worker was fired after he had an epileptic seizure
at work, he filed a charge with the EEOC against his employer alleging disability
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).230 The EEOC,
which has the same statutory enforcement authority under the ADA as it has
under Title VII and the ADEA,23" ' investigated the charge and filed a lawsuit to
enforce the ADA against the employer, seeking injunctive relief and individual
damages for the employee. However, the employee was not a party to the law-
suit: the plaintiff in the enforcement action was the EEOC.232 Because the em-
ployee individually had signed an agreement to arbitrate "'any dispute or claim'
concerning his employment" as a condition of getting the job, the employer
moved to compel arbitration.233
Looking at the statutes, prior precedent, and the FAA, the Supreme Court
found "no language.., suggesting that the existence of an arbitration agree-
ment between private parties materially changes the EEOC's statutory function
or the remedies that are otherwise available" or that "purport[s] to place any
restriction on a nonparty's choice of a judicial forum."23 4 The EEOC's enforce-
ment action did not require the employee's consent and was in no way con-
trolled by the employee: after filing an EEOC charge, the EEOC becomes "the
master of its own case," able to seek whatever statutorily-allowed remedies it
deems appropriate, even if the employee no longer wishes to pursue the
claims. 35 Relief for a specific victim serves an important public purpose, the
Court reasoned-for example, obtaining punitive damages on behalf of an in-
dividual employee serves a deterrent effect on potential future violations.236 As
such, the Court held the EEOC could pursue victim-specific relief in court on
behalf of the employee in addition to injunctive relief, despite an arbitration
agreement between the employer and employee; to rule otherwise would
"turn[] what is effectively a forum selection clause into a waiver of [the
EEOC's] statutory remedies. '" 23 7
229. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
230. Id. at 283-84.
231. See 2 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2012); Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 285-
86.
232. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
233. Id. at 282-83.
234. Id. at 288, 289.
235. Id. at 291-92.
236. Id. at 294-95.
237. Id. at 295, 298.
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An employee, therefore, may file and pursue an employment discrimina-
tion charge with the EEOC before being compelled to submit to mandatory ar-
bitration, and the EEOC may pursue a charge itself on behalf of the employee in
court, regardless of any arbitration agreement that may apply to the individual
employee.38
3. Systemic Class Claims Without Rule 23
Lastly, with its statutory authority to bring "pattern or practice" cases, the
EEOC can bring "systemic cases" affecting many plaintiffs, regardless of class
size and without having to meet the hurdle of class certification under Rule
23.239 As legal scholars have noted, this statutory authority confers an obvious
advantage to plaintiffs in the wake of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, which suggests that
the EEOC should bring more systemic cases. 4° What scholars have yet to high-
light, however, is that the EEOC may obtain this advantage whether it initiates
the lawsuit itself or intervenes in an existing lawsuit by an individual-meaning
that the EEOC may retain this procedural advantage even in cases it co-counsels
with private attorneys.
In 198o, in General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted the 1972 amendments to Title VII to hold that Rule
23 procedural requirements for certifying a class action did not apply to the
EEOC's own enforcement actions? 4' In subsequent cases, several federal courts
have held that this ruling applies equally to enforcement actions initiated by
private plaintiffs in which the EEOC later intervenes?'1 2 In United Telecom. v.
238. An employee who has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement may, however,
be compelled to arbitrate any cross-claims she files individually against the em-
ployer while she is an intervenor in the EEOC's enforcement action. See EEOC v.
Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc'y, 479 F.3d 561, 568-70, 568 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the case law on the issue).
239. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe-5 to -6 (2012); Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 320
(1980).
240. See, e.g., Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing out Pattern or Practice After Wal-Mart:
The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 138-54 (2013); Seiner, supra note 195, at
1352-56 (discussing the "governmental approach" to responding to Wal-Mart v.
Dukes); Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic Dis-
parate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387, 394 (2011).
241. General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. at 323-34.
242. See Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 673 (sth Cir. 1985); United Tele-
coms., Inc. v. Saffels, 741 F.2d 312, 313-14 (loth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
lO6O (1985); EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926, 948 (N.D. I11. 2001) (holding
that an EEOC pattern and practice case that arose from an individual, rather than
a Commissioner's charge, still need not comply with Rule 23); Glass v. IDS Fin.
Servs, 778 F. Supp. 1029, 105o n.34 (D. Minn. 1991) (explaining the history of fed-
eral decisions on this issue); Fields v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 95 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D. Kan.
1981) (stating that "(t]he presence of the EEOC as plaintiff makes it academic
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Saffels, the EEOC was granted a motion to intervene in a private plaintiff's sex
discrimination lawsuit against her employer, alleging class claims on behalf of
all similarly situated female employees. 43 Six years later, the district court
granted the EEOC permission to seek relief for the putative class without re-
quiring Rule 23 certification procedures.244 When the employer appealed to
compel the trial court to require the EEOC to meet Rule 23, the Tenth Circuit
held that the EEOC's ability to pursue systemic cases free from Rule 23 applied
equally when the EEOC "acts not as the initiator of a suit, but as an interve-
nor."245 Citing General Telephone, the Tenth Circuit explained that, based on
Title VII and its legislative history, "Congress viewed the Commission's role in
suits initiated by it or in which it intervened to serve the identical purpose," and
thus the rationale for the inapplicability of Rule 23 was the same.? 6
Likewise, in Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., the Fifth Circuit allowed the EEOC
to pursue class claims against an employer without requiring compliance with
Rule 23, even after the original four plaintiffs in whose case the EEOC had in-
tervened settled their individual claims.' 7 The plaintiffs brought a putative class
action for race discrimination in assignments, pay, and promotions on behalf of
all African-American employees in their division.' After the EEOC was grant-
ed permission to intervene, and before the plaintiffs had been certified as class
representatives, the plaintiffs settled their individual claims and moved to dis-
miss the case.249 Reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that, having
properly intervened in accordance with Title VII, the EEOC could pursue the
case without the original plaintiffs and that, "Rule 23's class action prerequisites
are as inapplicable when the EEOC intervenes as when it brings a direct suit."
50
As the court explained, when the EEOC litigates a case, "whether by direct suit
or by intervention," the agency is acting on behalf of those who filed charges,
their similarly situated co-workers, and the public: "[t]he EEOC's ability to
maintain suit 'in its own name' has no meaning apart from whatever relief the
Commission obtains for employees who have been treated as less than equal." 251
whether to certify a class under Rule 23"). But see Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Iac.,
195 F.3d 894, 899-9oo (7th Cir. 1999); Horn v. Eltra Corp., 686 F.2d 439, 441 D.
(6th Cir. 1982).
243. See Saffels, 741 F.2d at 313.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 314.
247. Harris, 768 F.2d at 673.
248. Id. at 672.
249. Id. at 673.
250. Id. at 686.
251. Id. at 682.
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Thus, the court held, the rationale of General Telephone applies equally to agen-
cy intervention and direct action.252
Yet this ability of the EEOC as intervenor to avoid Rule 23 for a putative
class is not unlimited. In a case in which plaintiffs' class certification was af-
firmatively denied and the EEOC's status as an intervenor was revoked, the
Sixth Circuit indicated, in a footnote, that General Telephone was limited to di-
rect actions by the EEOC and not applicable where the EEOC intervened in a
private suit. 53 In a later case, Jefferson v. Ingersoll International Inc., the Seventh
Circuit stopped short of "choos[ing] sides" between the Fifth and Tenth Circuit
approach and the Sixth Circuit's potential conflict, but raised another consider-
ation: differences in relief sought. 54 In Jefferson, the EEOC moved to intervene
in the plaintiffs' race discrimination in hiring case after the district court had
already granted certification to a limited class and the employer had filed an in-
terlocutory appeal on an issue under Rule 23.255 The Seventh Circuit was unper-
suaded that the EEOC's intervention at that point mooted the ongoing Rule 23
dispute.256 The EEOC and private plaintiffs may differ in the relief they seek,
particularly where plaintiffs may wish to pursue discrimination claims not en-
forced by the EEOC (for example, under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866); this would render the claims "logically and legally distinct," giving plain-
tiffs the choice to join the EEOC litigation or not.257
The Fifth Circuit applied a similar consideration in its Harris decision, too.
While it reversed the district court's dismissal of the case and allowed the EEOC
to pursue systemic claims as intervenor without the named plaintiffs and free
from Rule 23 requirements, it did so only "within the scope of the original
plaintiffs' claims. ' '1S8 When the EEOC had sought to intervene, it stipulated that
"the scope of its participation would be 'no greater than the scope of claims
raised in Plaintiffs' complaint"' and that it would not "depart from the 'field of
litigation' established by the original parties." 59 Noting that the ability to inter-
vene pursuant to Title VII "is not a carte blanche for agency investigation," the
Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's protective order that limited the agen-
252. Id. at 683.
253. Horn v. Eltra Corp., 686 F.2d 439, 441 n.i (6th Cir. 1982) ("General Telephone is
limited to EEOC actions brought in its own name and not ... to EEOC interven-
tions in a private action."). But see Harris, 768 F.2d at 681 n.21, 683 n.26 (distin-
guishing and discounting Horn as dicta).
254. Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 899-9oo (7th Cir. 1999).
255. Id. at 896.
256. Id. at 899.
257. Id. at 899-9oo.
258. Harris, 768 F.2d at 686.
259. Id. at 673.
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cy's ability to use data it had collected in discovery about the age and sex of the
defendant's employees to the current Harris race discrimination case only.2
60
The impact of EEOC intervention in an ongoing lawsuit on Rule 23 re-
quirements may vary depending on when the EEOC chooses to intervene and
the scope of the relief the plaintiffs and the EEOC seek on behalf of a similarly
situated class. Nevertheless, federal case law establishes that, within certain pa-
rameters, the EEOC's participation in a private plaintiffs putative class action
may help plaintiffs avoid Rule 23 altogether.
B. The Private Bar's Practical Advantages in an Era of Recessionary Federal
Budgets
Despite the EEOC's significant procedural advantages when litigating on
behalf of a Title VII plaintiff, the agency faces its own limitations. Thus, private
attorneys who represent plaintiffs enforcing private rights of action provide
practical advantages in Title VII enforcement efforts.
The most significant limitation on the EEOC, and relative advantage of pri-
vate plaintiffs' attorneys, is one of funding and capacity. As described previous-
ly, Congress and the President set the budget for public enforcement efforts of
the EEOC annually, making the EEOC beholden to politics and budgetary
woes. 26' The amount of enforcement litigation the EEOC can pursue is directly
related to its authorized budget, keeping the "historically underfunded '262 agen-
cy's caseload abysmally low: on average, the EEOC itself files a few hundred cas-
es annually, a mere 0.2% to o.6% of the charges it receives each year. 63 By con-
trast, private plaintiffs' attorneys tend to take cases on a contingency basis (for a
portion of the damages they recover) and, if they prevail, can seek attorneys'
fees and costs.2 64 This means that, in theory, a private case can finance itself
(and more), with no set cap on the number of cases private attorneys can pur-
sue. As a result, private plaintiffs' attorneys across the country file tens of thou-
sands of discrimination lawsuits in federal courts each year.265 Relatedly, private
plaintiffs' attorneys are also free from bureaucratic processes inherent in any
federal agency operation. For example, where the EEOC may require certain
260. Id. at 686.
261. See U.S. EEOC, Congressional Oversight, supra note 1o; U.S. EEOC, Fiscal Year
2014 Congressional Budget Justification, supra note lO; supra Part II.B.
262. See Seiner, supra note 195, at 1354.
263. See supra text accompanying note 57.
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(k) (2012); Wayne N.
Outten & Piper Hoffman, Working with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, lo EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 615, 621 (2006).
265. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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steps for approval before it can incur litigation expenses,266 a plaintiffs' attorney
enjoys the flexibility provided by its private operations.
Limited delegated authority and insufficient operating budgets have im-
pacted the EEOC's reputation for effectiveness among the private bar. While
many plaintiffs' attorneys appreciate working with the EEOC and take ad-
vantage of the administrative procedures it offers,267 others view the agency as
more of an obstacle to pursuing private lawsuits and want little more than a
right to sue letter from the EEOC, so that they may file in court.268 To date,
public and private enforcement channels have operated in a predominantly
separate and parallel manner, with the vast majority of employment discrimina-
tion lawsuits filed solely by private counsel or, alternatively, by the EEOC. Yet,
as discussed in Part IV.C, below, limited coordination already exists at various
points in the enforcement process, which provides the opportunity for deeper
collaboration to combine public procedural and private practical advantages in
antidiscrimination enforcement.
C. Reinvigorating the Administrative Resolution of Discrimination Claims
In light of recent constraints the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed on
plaintiffs in civil lawsuits, and considering the procedural advantages of the
EEOC that avoid these constraints, plaintiffs' attorneys and the EEOC should
reconsider their enforcement relationship. The diminished state of the private
right of action, in a time of the most constrained public enforcement in recent
history, has changed the field of play. Private litigation as usual may no longer
be enough to ensure Title VII's protections; to do so may now require working
more collaboratively and creatively through the administrative process. This
Part offers ideas for ways in which plaintiffs' attorneys and the EEOC could col-
laborate, proposing a reinvigorated combined public agency/private attorney
general model of Title VII enforcement.
To implement any of these ideas would require tackling the practical chal-
lenges each presents. Greater study to identify best practices and what can be
done within existing resources is needed; more importantly, willingness and
some amount of cultural change by both public and private enforcers would be
necessary. However, having presented both impending constraints facing anti-
discrimination enforcement and the legal framework supporting the potential
266. Outten & Hoffman, supra note 264, at 620; U.S. EEOC, Office of General Counsel,
Regional Attorney's Manual, supra note 107, at 39-46 (describing procedures for
initiating certain types of cases requiring approval).
267. See, e.g., Outten & Hoffman, supra note 265 at 621 ("Most plaintiffs' lawyers who
have litigated with the EEOC have found the agency's participation to be an as-
set.").
268. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 2, at 40.
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for its change, the goal of this Part is to serve as a jumping off point for future
inquiry.'"
i. Continue to Expand and Improve the EEOC Mediation Program
The EEOC currently offers administrative procedures that plaintiffs may,
but are not required to, take advantage of in addition to those required by ad-
ministrative exhaustion under Title VII. Chief among these is voluntary media-
tion: as soon as an employee files a charge with the EEOC, and before any inves-
tigation has occurred, the employee is offered the chance to mediate his claims.
If the employee agrees, the employer is invited to participate, again, voluntarily.
The mediation occurs before the employer has to respond to the charges filed
against it; the incentive for the employer to participate is that the employer
need not draft an answer or respond to information requests from the EEOC
before attempting mediation."'
The advantages to employees-particularly those who may be compelled to
arbitrate their claims individually under post-Pyett Court precedent-are clear:
mediation may resolve the case quickly, and allow an employee to agree to a
particular resolution (or not) rather than be bound by an arbitrator's ruling.
For plaintiffs' attorneys who have opted out of the voluntary mediation alto-
gether, now may be the time to reevaluate that position. One impediment to
plaintiffs' participation may be the assumption that any offer of damages by an
employer during voluntary mediation will be too low for a reasonable contin-
gency fee and provide little in the way of attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs' attorneys
could consider developing a new model of structuring fees based on their par-
ticipation in the administrative process. For example, plaintiffs' attorneys could
set a reasonable flat fee for drafting an EEOC charge and representing an em-
ployee through mediation or other stages of the administrative process, rather
than investing significant time in the hopes of high damages and attorneys' fees
at the end of protracted litigation.
Early mediation also benefits employers by allowing them to avoid re-
sponding to an EEOC charge or request for information.271 Early mediation,
however, may not deter an employer from making a "low-ball" offer to the em-
ployee to make the case go away. To get around this drawback, the EEOC could
consider pushing back the timing of the mediation until after the employer's
269. In future work, I plan to provide the theoretical framework and best practices for
specific administrative antidiscrimination law interventions.
270. See U.S. EEOC, An Evaluation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Mediation Program (Sept. 20, 2ooo), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/
report/chapter4.html#IV.D.3; U.S. EEOC, Mediation, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
mediation/index.cfm. For analysis of a proposal to mandate EEOC mediation, see
generally Green, supra note 2.
271. See U.S. EEOC, An Evaluation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Mediation Program, supra note 270; U.S. EEOC, Mediation, supra note 270.
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response is due, or offering mediation again later in the investigation process.272
While moving mediation to follow the employer's response or to later in the in-
vestigation process may affect the number of employers volunteering to medi-
ate, these changes could also place the employee and employer on more equal
footing in negotiations and make resolution more likely for those parties who
do participate.
In the wake of the suite of mandatory arbitration decisions, the EEOC
could also include, in its case intake process, a screening procedure to identify
complainants who may be subject to mandatory and binding predispute arbi-
tration agreements. This screening would allow the EEOC to focus its efforts
through investigation and possible voluntary dispute resolution, as permitted
under Waffle House, before the complainant finds himself compelled into man-
datory arbitration.
Of course, increasing voluntary mediation does not guarantee that more
cases will be resolved; nevertheless, there is potential for the EEOC to enhance
its current efforts and programs toward this end. Over the past decade, parties
in only eleven to fifteen percent of total discrimination charges received by the
EEOC each year have participated in voluntary mediation, yet those that do so
achieve good rates of success: two-thirds to three-quarters of cases that partici-
pated resulted in a resolution.273 Given the increased procedural challenges
plaintiffs now face once they receive their right to sue letters and attempt to
proceed in court, plaintiffs' attorneys and the EEOC should revisit the potential
for alternative dispute resolution throughout the administrative exhaustion
process to maximize the enforcement impact.
2. Encourage Plaintiffs' Attorneys to Work Through the EEOC Inves-
tigatory Process
Another administrative function of the EEOC now made more important
by recent Court precedent is the agency's factual investigation. When the EEOC
receives a charge of discrimination, the charge is assigned to an investigator,
who is tasked with conducting an investigation of the allegations in the charge
to determine whether the employee has reasonable cause for a discrimination
claim.Y4 According to the EEOC, a typical investigation takes an average of six
272. See E. Patrick McDermott, Anita Jose & Ruth Obar, An Investigation of the Reasons
for the Lack of Employer Participation in the EEOC Mediation Program, U.S. EEOC
(2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/report/study3/index.html ("Another
way to change the employer perception of the merits of the charge may be to al-
low the charge investigation to proceed and offer mediation at a later point.").
273. See U.S. EEOC, EEOC Mediation Statistics FY 1999 Through FY 2012, http://www
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/mediationstats.cfm; U.S. EEOC, Charge Statistics FY
1997 Through FY 2o13, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges
.cfm.
274. See Hirsh, supra note 53, at 243-46; U.S. EEOC, The Charge Handling Process, su-
pra note 53. Note that an employee may also or instead file a charge with the state
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months, and the investigator will issue a request for information to obtain
statement positions and all relevant policies, files, and documents from both
parties. 75 Indeed, the EEOC has broad investigative and subpoena authority to
request any documents "in the possession or under the control of the person
subpoenaed," to interview witnesses of all kinds, and to visit the workplace. 76
Yet the EEOC's authority during the investigation process is underutilized
by many plaintiffs. Not all claims are provided the same depth of investigation,
based on an assessment of the strength of the charge at intake: one study esti-
mated that as a result of "priority charge handling" procedures, only twenty
percent of cases received deep investigation, while another sixty percent re-
ceived moderate investigation.277 Moreover, an employee has the right to re-
quest that the EEOC close the case and issue a right to sue letter prior to com-
pleting its investigation.278 Because opinions about the efficacy of the EEOC's
investigations vary, some plaintiffs' attorneys opt not to engage in the investiga-
tory process and simply obtain a right to sue letter to pursue the case in court
on their own.2 79
The EEOC's investigatory process is a second area in which plaintiffs' at-
torneys and the EEOC can take affirmative steps to limit the damage that may
be caused by Twombly and Iqbal. Plaintiffs' attorneys who generally opt not to
engage with the investigation could work more actively with their assigned in-
vestigators to put the EEOC's resources to use developing enough facts early on
to allow them to draft a complaint that clearly meets the new "plausibility"
pleading standard. The EEOC could focus on helping their investigators under-
stand what the law now requires and ensure that they are helping employees
meet the challenge of new pleading standards, should its investigation result in
a finding that discrimination may have occurred.
Fair Employment Practices Agency (FEPA), which may conduct its own investiga-
tion pursuant to a worksharing agreement with the EEOC. See, e.g., Lisa M.
Durham Taylor, Untangling the Web Spun by Title VIl's Referral and Deferral
Scheme, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 427 (2010); U.S. EEOC, FY 2o12 EEOC/FEPA Model
Worksharing Agreement, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa-wsa2012.cfm. A
full discussion of state FEPAs' roles in this process is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle.
275. See U.S. EEOC, The Charge Handling Process, supra note 53.
276. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15-17 (2014).
277. See Hirsh, supra note 53, at 243-47; see also Paul M. Igasaki & Paul Steven Miller,
U.S. EEOC, Priority Charge Handling Task Force, Litigation Task Force Report
(Mar. 1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task-reports/chargehandling.cfm.
278. See 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-5(f) (1) (2012); U.S. EEOC, Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 22.
279. See, e.g., Selmi, The Value of the EEOC, supra note 2, at 12, 40 (noting the signifi-
cant proportion of plaintiffs who request right to sue letters).
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3. Establish Public-Private Partnerships for Systemic Cases
Lastly, in light of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the ability of the EEOC to pursue sys-
temic discrimination claims on behalf of a class without having to meet Rule 23,
whether the EEOC initiates or intervenes in the case, offers a unique opportunity
for an enforcement partnership. The EEOC has recently identified pursuing sys-
temic litigation as an agency priority." ° And the EEOC already co-counsels a
small number of cases each year with private counsel: one EEOC report identi-
fied that, between 1993 and 1998, the EEOC intervened in, on average, six cases
per year. s ' In a recent study of cases litigated by the EEOC in the decade be-
tween 1997 and 20o6, Professors Margo Schlanger and Pauline Kim identified
that only about 9% were "systemic" cases. s2 Their dataset showed the EEOC in-
tervening in only 0.5% (11 of 2316) of cases, but plaintiffs hiring their own coun-
sel who intervened in the EEOC's case in 31 percent (718 of 2316 cases)."s Thus,
there is both an existing model of, and significant room for an increase in, col-
laborative co-counseling by the EEOC and private plaintiffs' attorneys, particu-
larly for systemic cases.
The EEOC could consider establishing a more formal relationship with se-
lect private plaintiffs' counsel whom the agency preapproves to co-counsel sys-
temic cases. By partnering with select private attorneys to co-counsel systemic
cases, the EEOC could spread its existing litigation resources exponentially,
staffing many more systemic cases more leanly. Co-counseling would also allow
private plaintiffs' attorneys some protection from the increased financial risk of
pursuing class actions under a narrowed Rule 23 by avoiding the Rule altogeth-
er. This "super-hybrid" form of enforcement would go beyond deputizing pri-
vate attorneys to act on their own, instead fusing public and private enforce-
ment resources-and their relative advantages.
For such a partnership to work if the EEOC seeks to intervene in a class
case filed by a private attorney, the agency must meet the requirements of Fed-
280. See U.S. EEOC, Strategic Enforcement Plan FY 2013-2016, at 7, http://www
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf; U.S. EEOC, Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years
2012-2o16, at 19 http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic-plan-12to16.pdf.
281. See Igasaki & Miller, supra note 277 ("During the past five years, the Commission
has approved no more than 30 interventions. At the beginning of June 1997, only
seven of the nearly 350 Commission lawsuits were based on interventions."); see
also Outten & Hoffman, supra note 264, at 619 (describing how the EEOC's in-
volvement in co-counseled cases ranges from the "EEOC steer[ing] the litigation"
or "sharing the load equally" to "plaintiffs' attorneys tak[ing] the lead role, with
the EEOC lending its name and resources").
282. Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and Structural Reform of the Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 1541 (2014).
283. Data and a description of their data set are available at EEOC Litigation Project,
http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu, and by downloading "Date Codebook" (for an ex-
planation of variables) and "Master" under "Data Downloads," and comparing
variables 37 "eeoclntervened" and 39 "plaintiffPrivCounsel."
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eral Rule of Civil Procedure 24 and its enforcement authority under Title VII-
which it has done regularly in the cases it has co-counseled in the past. 4 These
requirements are not steep, but do ensure that the EEOC has a meaningful role
in each systemic case rather than just providing a "rubber stamp" designed to
do an end-run around Rule 23. Under Rule 24, the EEOC may move for permis-
sive intervention, which a court may allow for a government agency "if a party's
claim or defense is based on ... a statute or executive order administered by the
officer or agency; or... any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement is-
sued or made under the statute or executive order. '285 So long as the EEOC's
motion is timely and does not "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the original parties' rights," the intervention may be granted.26 (Should the
EEOC initiate the systemic case, a private plaintiff on whose EEOC charge the
case is based can also intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a).)" 8
In addition, for the EEOC to intervene in a private case, Title VII requires
the agency to certify that the case is of "general public importance," which
means that the case "directly affect[s] a large number of aggrieved individuals,
involve[s] a discriminatory policy or practice requiring injunctive relief, or
ha[s] potential for addressing significant legal issues."' 8 In making this certifi-
cation, the EEOC will consider "[p] rivate counsel's ability to litigate the case ef-
fectively without the Commission's participation," including the fact that "in-
tervention may be appropriate if it significantly increases the likelihood of
success in an important case."289 By definition, a potential systemic case that
now faces a steeper hurdle to class certification post-Wal-Mart v. Dukes meets
these requirements.
4. Responses to Likely Counterarguments
As with any proposal to change an enforcement status quo, these three ide-
as for reviving administrative antidiscrimination law will likely face objections
and legitimate practical challenges.
First, if the goal is to maintain enforcement efforts without additional
funding to the EEOC, couldn't all of these suggestions arguably be more de-
manding on existing EEOC resources? One response to this challenge is that the
resources that exist are sufficient; they need only be reallocated. For example,
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012); see, e.g., Billouin v. Monsanto Co., 162 F.R.D.
351 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
285. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
286. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3).
287. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a).
288. See U.S. EEOC, Office of the General Counsel, Regional Attorney's Manual, Part
2.1V D. Standards for Commission Intervention in Private Actions, http://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/litigation/manual/2-4-d-standardsintervention.cfmn.
289. Id.
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increased mediation efforts and more rigorous investigation may result in more
early case resolution and settlement, thus freeing up resources that would be
spent later on in the enforcement process. Additional costs in the early stages of
the EEOC administrative process could be offset by reduced costs later in the
process, requiring a redistribution of existing resources rather than a net in-
crease. Likewise, given that the EEOC has an existing budget for pursing direct
litigation, a small portion of this could be redirected to establish screening and
co-counseling procedures for systemic case partnerships that would return div-
idends by spreading existing resources to more cases overall.
Alternatively, the EEOC could expand current or seek new means of defray-
ing the cost of increased investigation and mediation. For investigations, the
EEOC could explore increased participation of, or partnership with, investiga-
tors from state fair employment agencies, with whom the EEOC currently
maintains worksharing agreements.29 For increased mediation efforts, the
EEOC could expand relationships with law school mediation clinics to perform
mediations pro bono,29' or could consider requiring employer defendants to
provide some portion of the costs of mediation-which is currently free to par-
ticipants and funded entirely by the EEOC 29 ---should the case be resolved by
mediation. And, to the extent that screening for mandatory arbitration clauses
and conducting more rigorous investigation help plaintiffs overcome potential
challenges in court posed by Iqbal/Twombly and post-Pyett constraints on the
private right of action, anticipating and resolving these challenges may make
private attorneys more willing to take on individual plaintiffs' cases, thus re-
moving them from the EEOC's caseload entirely.
Second, if the legal and legislative framework for a coordinated (as opposed
to parallel) public/private hybrid enforcement system already exists, why hasn't
there been significant coordination to date? The clearest response to this chal-
lenge is that, from the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act until 2007, there was
little incentive for either public or private enforcers to combine their efforts.
The EEOC could rely on private plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue most middle-
and high-value enforcement cases, while focusing their efforts on public en-
forcement priorities and lower damages cases of underrepresented workers. Yet,
as this Article documents, budget constraints and high demand on the EEOC
since the recession and procedural constraints on the private right of action un-
der the Roberts' Court have radically altered this reality, providing new motiva-
290. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13, 1601.15 (2014); U.S. EEOC, FY 2012 EEOCIFEPA Model
Worksharing Agreement, supra note 274.
291. The EEOC has already established such relationships. See, e.g., Mediation Clinic,
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO L. SCH., http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/mediationclinic; Me-
diation Clinic, COLUM. L. SCH., web.law.columbia.edu/clinics/mediation-clinic;
Mediation Clinic, U. PA. L. SCH., www.law.upenn.edu/clinic/mediation.
292. U.S. EEOC, Facts About Mediation, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/facts
.cfm; U.S. EEOC, Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Budget Justification, supra note
ioi, at 29-10.
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tion to combine forces. No longer can either half of the enforcement equation
rely on the other to pick up the slack; a coordinated effort may now be neces-
sary to ensure the promise of Title VII.
One concrete obstacle that public and private enforcers will need to over-
come for greater co-counseling of systemic cases is agreement on any issues
where their requirements and goals differ. Specifically, unlike private attorneys,
the EEOC is not entitled to recover attorneys' fees when it prevails in litiga-
tion.2 93 Likewise, the EEOC and private plaintiffs' attorneys may place different
emphasis on obtaining injunctive relief for plaintiffs and may feel differently
about agreeing to a confidentiality agreement. 94 Nevertheless, these differences
are resolvable, as coordination already occurs in the small number of cases the
EEOC currently co-counsels with private attorneys, which may serve as a model
for future co-counseling agreements. 95
Relatedly, cultures and reputations developed over the past two decades
pose attitudinal barriers that may have hampered coordination. Depending on
experiences with their local district office, some private plaintiffs' attorneys may
view the EEOC as providing little help to their cases.96 Even worse, they may
view EEOC participation as detrimental to their private lawsuits: in a handful of
recent cases, the EEOC has been subject to sanctions and ordered to pay large
attorneys' fees awards,2 97 and has been challenged on whether it met its statuto-
ry obligation to conciliate prior to filing suit (the legal import of which is cur-
rently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court).9g From the EEOC's perspec-
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2012); Outten & Hoffman, supra note 264, at 617-18, 622.
294. Outten & Hoffman, supra note 264, at 617-18, 622.
295. Id.; see also Igasaki & Miller, supra note 277 ("[T]he General Counsel should pro-
vide specific guidance to the field on the relationship between private counsel and
the EEOC in intervention actions. This could perhaps best be done by the creation
of model agreements between Commission attorneys and private counsel contain-
ing standard language to be required, unless special defined circumstances exist,
before intervention is authorized.").
296. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 2, at 12, 40 (noting the significant proportion of plain-
tiffs who request right to sue letters); see also Written Testimony of Daniel
Kohrman, National Employment Lawyers Association, Meeting of July 18, 202-
Public Input into the Development of EEOC's Strategic Enforcement Plan, US EEOC
(July 18, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-18-12/kohrman.cfm (discuss-
ing the impact of the EEOC's policies on private plaintiffs' attorneys).
297. See, e.g., EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding award
of over $750,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to defendant employer); EEOC v.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. o7-CV-95-LRR, 2013 WL 3984478 (N.D. Iowa
2013) (awarding more than $4.6 million in attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses to
defendant employer); see also Engstrom, supra note 2, at 704-05 (discussing recent
EEOC missteps).
298. See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (7 th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019).
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tive, some EEOC investigators and attorneys may view private plaintiffs' attor-
neys as primarily focused on monetary damages with little regard for ensuring
injunctive relief to truly remedy discrimination.299 These attitudinal barriers are
not insurmountable, however, as evidenced by the close cooperation of plain-
tiffs' attorneys and EEOC employees on the vast majority of EEOC cases pur-
sued and the handful of cases already co-counseled each year. There is no doubt
that, for plaintiffs' attorneys, submitting a case to more rigorous agency investi-
gation and, for EEOC attorneys, co-counseling a greater portion of cases with
private attorneys would require some culture change and giving up of one's en-
forcement "turf." These are no small issues. However, the dramatic changes in
the landscape of antidiscrimination enforcement over the past seven years may
provide the motivation necessary to help enforcers recognize that their similar
interests outweigh any differences in their approaches.
Each suggestion proposed in this Part requires the willingness of those
tasked with antidiscrimination enforcement efforts to collaborate, and calls for
a closer study of costs, efficiencies, and best practices for achieving coordina-
tion. Nevertheless, these suggestions provide a starting point for how revived
use of administrative procedures and public-private enforcement partnerships
can mitigate the potential damage from recent Supreme Court precedent dur-
ing a recessionary economy on Title VII enforcement. A combined public agen-
cy/private attorney general enforcement approach also makes the most of both
mechanisms Congress provided in the design of Title VII: the EEOC's statutory
enforcement authority and the individual private right of action.
CONCLUSION: PERFECTING THE VISION
When Congress passed Title VII in 1964, it did so with a hybrid enforce-
ment scheme: the EEOC was established to set policy and provide stewardship,
and individual plaintiffs were given a private right of action to enforce the stat-
ute's antidiscrimination mandate. In amending the statute throughout the dec-
ades that followed, Congress expanded the EEOC's enforcement authority
slightly and enhanced incentives for private attorneys to enforce plaintiffs'
rights. The EEOC has played an essential role, particularly in gatekeeping and
policy guidance; yet the EEOC's enforcement capability has been severely lim-
ited by Congress's reduction of its annual operating budget. Meanwhile, em-
ployee plaintiffs and their ability to pursue private litigation in court have been
crucial to enforcing the nation's antidiscrimination laws.
Over the past six years, while the U.S. economy was in a near historic reces-
sion, data indicate that inequality in the American job market was exacerbated,
making antidiscrimination protections all the more important. But just as the
recession affected workplaces and unemployment rates, the economic down-
turn also affected the EEOC directly: as a result of recessionary budget cuts, the
staffing and litigation capacity of the agency appears to be at its lowest point in
recent history.
299. See Schlanger & Kim, supra note 282, at 1583 & 1582-83 n.258.
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During this same time period, the U.S. Supreme Court has made a series of
procedural decisions that have significantly narrowed the private right of action
provided under Title VII. In a series of cases decided between 2007 and 2013, the
Court increased pleading standards, strengthened mandatory arbitration, and
interpreted the rules of class certification narrowly. As the collective result of
these decisions, the ability of employees to bring private enforcement actions in
federal court-an ability key to the enforcement scheme of Title VII-appears
to be in jeopardy.
With both public and private means for enforcing U.S. antidiscrimination
law now threatened, those who enforce Title VII-the EEOC and private plain-
tiffs' attorneys-should consider how they can work together to make more ro-
bust use of administrative procedures available under current law and funding
availability. Combining the procedural advantages of the EEOC (which remains
mostly insulated from the Court's recent procedural decisions), with the practi-
cal advantages of the private bar (which remains free from recessionary budget
caps and bureaucracy), offers a new model for ensuring enforcement. Engaging
in public-private partnership and moving toward greater use of administrative
antidiscrimination law can serve as a way out of this "recession" in antidiscrim-
ination enforcement. Such a partnership can also maximize the enforcement
potential of Title VII by making the most of both parts of Congress's hybrid en-
forcement compromise.
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